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ABSTRACT 
North Carolina has a new LLC act.  If LLC members assert that the 
managers or controlling members have in some manner breached fiduciary 
or contractual duties owed to the complaining members or to the LLC, how 
will lawyers handle such claims?  This Article first considers the 
circumstances in which North Carolina LLC managers and members may 
owe fiduciary duties to other members.  Assuming that there is a duty that 
may have been breached, what are the limits on a member bringing a 
direct suit either on her own behalf or on behalf of the LLC?  Since direct 
suits will now be prohibited in many cases, the plaintiff must likely resort to 
bringing a derivative claim.  The problems with these suits under the new 
law are considered in some detail.  Lastly, the Article provides drafting 
suggestions to protect LLC members, as well as alternative methods to 
resolve disputes among LLC members and managers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
North Carolina has a new LLC act.1  The act includes significant 
changes to the state’s former LLC structure.2  For instance, the new act 
provides a framework to allow for the elimination of fiduciary duties, and it 
allows LLC members to agree on alternative dispute remedies for resolving 
internal disputes.3  While the act might benefit limited-liability companies 
in many ways, it also raises many questions.  For instance, if LLC members 
assert that the managers, or those in control, have in some manner breached 
fiduciary or contractual duties owed to the complaining members or to the 
LLC, how will lawyers handle such claims? 
This Article first notes that it may be difficult for an LLC member to 
demonstrate that she is owed a fiduciary duty, and even if this can be 
demonstrated, she may be required to pursue her claim through a derivative 
lawsuit.  This Article considers the new derivative procedures, with a 
particular focus on problems that may come up in pursuing derivative 
claims.  The Article concludes by suggesting ways to avoid these problems. 
I. DO LLC MANAGERS OWE FIDUCIARY DUTIES? 
There are already thousands of reported cases across the country 
involving disputes among members and managers of LLCs.  A large 
number of those cases raise breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.4  Managers 
have been sued for breaching their duty of care,5 and for various breaches 
of the duty of loyalty, such as self-dealing.6  Assertions of “wantonness” 
and other claims have been made.7  A common question in these disputes is 
 
 1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-1-01 to -11-03 (amended 2014).  
 2. Id. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (repealed 2013).  
 3. See id. §§ 57D-2-30(b)(6), (e) (amended 2014). 
 4. See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES §§ 9:1 to :8, at 517–85, §§ 10:1 to :4, at 639–77 (2d ed. 
2015) (listing myriad reported cases involving disputes among members and managers). 
 5. See id. § 9:2, at 525–31 (citing numerous cases in the notes to the section). 
 6. See id. § 9:3, at 531–39 (citing numerous cases in the notes to the section). 
 7. See, e.g., Polk v. Polk, 70 So. 3d 363, 374 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (citing Jordan v. 
Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129, 131–32 (S.C. 2005)). 
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whether a duty is owed to the LLC, to the members, or to both.8  Similar 
disputes have popped up in North Carolina, and it is likely that even more 
of these arguments will arise as more LLCs are formed in the state. 
A. Fiduciary Duties Created by Status 
Unlike in many states,9 neither members nor managers of LLCs in 
North Carolina owe fiduciary duties to each other based on their status 
alone.  Members, like shareholders, owe no fiduciary duties to one 
another.10  Managers, like directors, also owe no fiduciary duties to the 
individual members.11 
Other states with similar statutes have likewise concluded that since 
their statute mandates only manager duties to the LLC, it intentionally 
negates any duties to the members.12  Although the wording of the North 
 
 8. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:4, at 666–69. 
 9. In 2013, the Delaware legislature adopted an amendment to section 18-1104 of the 
Delaware Code “to confirm that in some circumstances fiduciary duties not explicitly 
provided for in the limited liability company agreement apply.  For example, a manager of a 
manager-managed limited liability company would ordinarily have fiduciary duties even in 
the absence of a provision in the limited liability company agreement establishing such 
duties.”  H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013); see also 2 F. HODGE 
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 6:18, at 6-40 (rev. 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter O’NEAL 
& THOMPSON, OPPRESSION] (“Newer LLC statutes state unequivocally that members of a 
LLC owe each other fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  Where statutes are silent or 
incomplete, most courts have held duties owed to members as well as the entity.” (citations 
omitted)); RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, §§ 9:1 to :8, at 517–85, §§ 10:1 to :4, at 
639–77. 
 10. Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 137 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
Freese v. Smith, 428 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)); see also Selvidio v. Gillespie 
(In re Gillespie), Ch. 11 Case No. 10-30942, Adv. No. 10-3187, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1261, 
at *11–13 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2012) (applying Kaplan to reject a direct claim 
brought by a member against the key managing member).  But see Norman v. Nash Johnson 
& Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 260 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[O]ur cases have 
consistently held that majority shareholders in a close corporation owe a ‘special duty’ and 
obligation of good faith to minority shareholders.”). 
 11. Kaplan, 675 S.E.2d at 137 (citing, as authority, a number of corporation cases, 
including Governors Club, Inc. v. Governors Club Ltd. P’ship, 567 S.E.2d 781, 786−87 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002)); see also Lake House Acad. for Girls LLC v. Jennings, No. 11 CVS 
1666, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 41, at *21−24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2011) (discussing the 
Kaplan principles and noting that a member–manager might not be able to limit her 
fiduciary duties by resigning as a manager, since the LLC agreement stated that all members 
were automatically managers, and defendant retained her membership interest). 
 12. See, e.g., Price v. Smith, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115 (E.D. Wis. 2012); Dawson v. 
Delisle, No. 283195, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1553, at *9−11 (Mich. Ct. App. July 21, 
2009); Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 673 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Va. 2009); WAKA, LLC v. 
4
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Carolina statute has been slightly changed in the new 2013 act, it is clear 
that no substantive change is intended; the drafters continue to assume that 
any fiduciary duties created by being in charge of the LLC are owed only 
to the entity.13  This is likely further confirmed by new section 57D-2-32, 
which implies that if fiduciary or contractual duties are not set forth in the 
operating agreement, they do not exist.14  However, could a plaintiff 
convince a court “that despite the comprehensive nature of the LLC Act, 
LLC members retain the ability to sue for damages based on common law 
claims such as repudiation or breach of contract and breach of fiduciary 
duty”?15 
It is also important to remember that historically, applying the 
internal-affairs doctrine, the law of the jurisdiction where the LLC is 
formed will determine whether a duty exists and whether that duty was 
breached.16  However, one of the 2013 changes to the North Carolina LLC 
 
Humphrey, No. 2006-14305, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 96, at *7−10 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 2, 2007); 
cf. Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 F.3d 610, 617 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that with respect to 
the parallel North Carolina corporate statute, the legislature intentionally deleted the word 
“shareholders” to negate any inference that there is a duty running from directors to 
shareholders; however, there was never a similar modification of the LLC statute); Halebian 
v. Berv, 931 N.E.2d 986, 992 (Mass. 2010) (“However, the maxim of negative 
implication—that the express inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another—
‘requires great caution in its application.’” (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE 
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:25, at 429 (7th ed. 
2007))).  Contra Internal Med. All., LLC v. Budell, 659 S.E.2d 668, 673−74 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2008) (finding that managing members owe duties to members, even though the statute only 
mentions duties to the LLC); T-WOL Acquisition Co. v. ECDG S., LLC, 725 S.E.2d 605, 
617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“However, directors and officers of a corporation owe a fiduciary 
duty to the corporation and the shareholders.” (citing Meiselman v. Meiselman, 295 S.E.2d 
249, 259 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), modified and aff’d, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983))). 
 13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-3-21(b)–(c) (amended 2014). 
 14. Id. § 57D-2-32 (stating that the primary purpose of this new section is to permit the 
creation of remedies that might not otherwise be enforceable). 
 15. OLP, L.L.C. v. Burningham, 225 P.3d 177, 181 (Utah 2009).  In addition to 
determining that Utah’s LLC act did not preempt the member’s common-law rights, the 
Utah Supreme Court also stated that the member in that case was not required to pursue his 
claims pursuant to the LLC act dissolution procedures, and that the member’s remedies were 
not limited by the provisions of the LLC act.  Id. at 181–82; cf. Willard v. Moneta Bldg. 
Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999) (stating that the LLC statute, which provides 
that directors shall act in the best interest of the corporation, “does not abrogate the common 
law duties of a director”). 
 16. See, e.g., Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 652 S.E.2d 231, 235 (N.C. 2007) (citing 
former section 57C-7-01 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which provided that the 
liability of an LLC’s members or managers is governed by the laws of the state of 
formation). 
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statute conceivably could bring that into question.17 
B. Fiduciary Duties Created in “Fact” 
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined a fiduciary 
relationship as one in which “there has been a special confidence reposed 
in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and 
with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence.”18  Such a 
duty “extends to any possible case in which a fiduciary relationship exists 
in fact, and in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and resulting 
domination and influence on the other.”19  This is consistent with similar 
statements found in other jurisdictions.20 
 
 17. Nelson v. All. Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11 CVS 3217, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 39, at 
*26 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2013) (relying on language in former section 57C-7-01 of the 
North Carolina General Statutes to conclude that the law of the state of formation controls), 
appeal dismissed, 761 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).  The section of the General Statutes 
on which Nelson relied has since been repealed.  See Act of June 19, 2013, ch. 157, sec. 1, 
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 387, 387 (repealing chapter 57C of the North Carolina General 
Statutes).  New section 57D-7-05(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes, effective as of 
January 1, 2014, retains language that a foreign LLC “has the same but no greater rights and 
has the same but no greater privileges as, and is subject to the same duties, restrictions, 
penalties, and liabilities now or later imposed on [a North Carolina] LLC of like character.”  
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-7-05(c).  Does this language, coupled with the repeal of the 
language that one might look to the state of formation to determine the liabilities of a 
manager, suggest that courts should now apply the principle that “[f]or actions sounding in 
tort, the state where the injury occurred is considered the situs of the claim”?  Nelson, 2013 
NCBC LEXIS 39, at *25 (alteration in original) (quoting Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 
S.E.2d 849, 854 (N.C. 1988)); cf. Associated Packaging, Inc. v. Jackson Paper Mfg. Co., 
No. 10 CVS 745, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *10–24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2012) (stating 
that the choice-of-law provision in an LLC operating agreement did not govern the alleged 
tort and securities violations—both claims were controlled by the lex loci doctrine, with the 
court providing extensive analysis as to how to determine the situs of each of the two 
claims). 
 18. Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (N.C. 2001) (quoting Abbitt v. Gregory, 160 
S.E. 896, 906 (N.C. 1931)). 
 19. Id. at 707–08 (quoting Abbitt, 160 S.E. at 906). 
 20. See, e.g., Berman v. Sugo LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d 191, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting 
that in order to determine if a fiduciary relationship exists, “New York courts typically focus 
on whether one person has reposed trust or confidence in another who thereby gains a 
resulting superiority or influence over the first”); Tully v. McLean, 948 N.E.2d 714, 739–40 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“A fiduciary relationship exists where, by reason of friendship, agency, 
or business association and experience, trust and confidence are reposed by one party in 
another and the latter party gains an influence and superiority over the first as a 
result. . . . The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that one party is dominated by another; 
the presence of a significant degree of dominance and superiority.” (first citing Maercker 
Point Villas Condo. Ass’n v. Szymski, 655 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (1995); then citing Lagen v. 
Balcor Co., 653 N.E.2d 968, 975 (1995))); cf. McKee v. James, No. 09 CVS 3031, 2013 
6
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One court noted this in the LLC context,21 but also stated that “[o]nly 
when one party figuratively holds all the cards—all the financial power or 
technical information, for example—have North Carolina courts found that 
the special circumstance of a fiduciary relationship has arisen.”22 
The operating agreement could obviously impose fiduciary duties on 
the managers to the members.23  A party may also create a “special duty” to 
an LLC member that the member can enforce by behavior24 or by 
contract.25 
Although the drafters of the new LLC act have attempted to limit the 
imposition of non-bargained-for fiduciary duties, given that most LLCs are 
closely held,26 it will not be surprising if North Carolina courts find that the 
relationships among those in these entities, often operating similar to a 
partnership, mandate the finding of fiduciary duties among the managers 
and members.27  Likewise, the courts may ultimately conclude that, similar 
 
NCBC LEXIS 33, at *20–21 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013) (stating that the plaintiff could 
not show a long-standing, personal relationship that might create a fiduciary duty, but 
finding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a special duty from majority shareholder to 
minority shareholder to allow the claim of breach of fiduciary duty to withstand dismissal); 
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Tex. 1997) (holding that, at 
least in Texas, in order to impose an informal fiduciary duty in a business transaction, the 
special relationship of trust and confidence must exist “prior to, and apart from, the 
agreement made the basis of the suit” (citing Transp. Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 
280 (Tex. 1995))). 
 21. Morris v. Hennon & Brown Props., LLC, No. 1:07CV780, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
55963, at *11–12 (M.D.N.C. July 3, 2008) (quoting S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners 
141, LLC, 659 S.E.2d 442, 451 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 22. Id. at *12 (quoting Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 
348 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 23. See, e.g., Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 277 (Tex. App. 2012) (noting that 
where fiduciary duties are contractually owed to the “members” (plural), this should not be 
interpreted to mean that the duties run only collectively rather than individually). 
 24. See BOGNC, LLC v. Cornelius NC Self-Storage, LLC, Nos. 10 CVS 19072, 10 
CVS 12371, 11 CVS 21122, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2013) 
(noting that a member’s assertion of fraud against his co-manager survived a motion for 
summary judgment because factual questions existed as to whether the co-manager had a 
duty to disclose and whether statements were affirmative misrepresentations). 
 25. Dawson v. Atlanta Design Assocs., Inc., 551 S.E.2d 877, 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) 
(stating that the defendant entered into a contract specifically with a member of the LLC to 
design the LLC’s facility and thus owed a “special duty” directly to the plaintiff—one of 
four members of the LLC). 
 26. See 2 CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
¶ 10.09[1], at 10-54 to -58 (2006) (explaining that federal taxation issues and illiquidity 
make LLCs attractive to small groups of owners rather than large groups). 
 27. In Kaplan, the court was willing to consider whether to apply partnership 
principles, but found that such principles should not apply in that case because the operating 
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to duties owed by majority shareholders,28 majority LLC members owe 
fiduciary duties to the minority members.29  The corporate opinions have 
been consistent in stating that even if the defendant is able to exercise 
 
agreement had explicitly negated any duties.  Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 
133, 140 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).  However, the court also stated that even if a duty had been 
breached, the liability would only extend to the LLC and not to the members.  See id.; cf. 
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557–58 (N.C. 1983) (recognizing that the 
relationship of those in a close corporation should be treated the same as a relationship 
between partners); LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 28, at *13–
14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011). 
  Prior to trial, the LeCann court observed “that the parties, as fifty percent 
shareholders in the Entities, acted more as partners than shareholders.”  Id.  Further, 
“[g]iven the nature of the professional relationship between the parties, the organization of 
the Entities and the fact that both parties contend they owed the other a fiduciary duty of 
care,” the court concluded “that there exist[ed] one or more genuine issues of material fact 
as to whether Defendant Cobham owed Plaintiff a special duty under the first exception to 
the Barger rule.”  Id.  Accordingly, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  See 
id.  However, after hearing the case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to 
bring her individual claims within either of the two exceptions to the Barger rule discussed 
infra notes 58–66 and accompanying text.  See LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 
2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *26–28 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012); see also BISHOP & 
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, ¶ 10.09[3][b], at 10-65 to -70 (discussing cases and supporting 
policies that have recognized (in some circumstances) that managers and members owe 
fiduciary duties, often based on comparison to partnership and close-corporation principles). 
 28. See Farndale Co. v. Gibellini, 628 S.E.2d 15, 19–21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“In 
North Carolina, it is well established that a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to 
minority shareholders.” (quoting Freese v. Smith, 428 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1993))); Oakeson v. TBM Consulting Grp., Inc., No. 08 CVS 3884, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 34, 
at *17–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) (applying North Carolina law and noting that 
since 1908, courts have applied the principle that majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties 
to minority shareholders that will be enforced by the courts). 
 29. Bolier & Co. v. Decca Furniture (USA) Inc., No. 5:12-cv-00160-RLV-DSC, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26791, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2013) (stating that a majority LLC 
member owes fiduciary duties to both the LLC and the minority members, and may not 
deprive them of their “reasonable expectations” in the LLC); Morris v. Hennon & Brown 
Props., LLC, No. 1:07CV780, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55963, at *14–16 (M.D.N.C. July 3, 
2008) (citing Aubin v. Susi, 560 S.E.2d 875, 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (observing that 
minority shareholders in a close corporation may bring a direct action when wrongdoers are 
controlling directors or shareholders who have converted, appropriated, or wasted corporate 
assets, so that corporate recovery would not protect minority shareholders, and stating that 
this principle should be applied in the LLC context)); cf. Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v. 
Ne. Am. Baseball, LLC (In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc.), 361 B.R. 422, 462 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2007) (concluding that although an LLC manager does not owe a fiduciary duty to 
the members simply by his position as manager, “[s]ince the majority members of an LLC 
have a duty to its minority members and Defendant Wolff’s authority as manager . . . is 
derived entirely from the exercise of powers delegated by the [majority] ‘member-
managers’ of the LLC, it follows . . . that Defendant . . . owed a duty to the LLC’s 
individual members.” (citation omitted)). 
8
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control of the closely held corporation, no fiduciary duties will be imposed 
if the plaintiff actually owns 50% of the stock.30 
One North Carolina Business Court judge noted that a minority 
shareholder should not be presumed to have the right to directly sue a 
controlling majority shareholder in a dispute regarding what best serves the 
corporation “because of the freedom of contract granted to LLC members 
to obtain minority protections not available to shareholders of the closely-
held corporation and because the procedural hurdles which might defeat a 
derivative claim on behalf of a closely-held corporation might not defeat a 
derivative claim on behalf of the LLC.”31  The court went on to note that an 
LLC member does not face the corporate procedural hurdle of the 
inflexible pre-litigation demand requirement, and thus, forcing the LLC 
member to utilize a derivative suit is justified.32  However, pursuant to the 
2013 act, the procedural rules for both LLC and corporate derivative 
actions are essentially the same today.33  The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s warning that the minority owner often does not negotiate for 
protections either because of a lack of awareness of the risks, weakness of 
bargaining position, assumption that disagreements will not arise, or total 
inability to negotiate for protections, such as when memberships are 
obtained through inheritance or by gift, is as applicable to the LLC member 
as it is to a closely held shareholder.34 
North Carolina courts have applied rigorous tests to determine if a 
defendant “holds all the cards.”  In Kaplan, the fact that the alleged 
wrongdoer provided all of the financing for the LLC was not sufficient to 
establish a fiduciary duty.35  In a business court decision, the judge 
 
 30. Maurer v. Maurer, No. 13 CVS 4421, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 41, at *11–12 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2013) (citing a number of opinions where the 50% ownership eliminated 
the plaintiff’s claim that she was owed a special duty that would give her standing to bring a 
direct suit). 
 31. Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *13–14 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 8, 2013).  The court concluded that the LLC member’s individual claims could be 
resolved derivatively, but that he still retained the right “to pursue his Meiselman claims 
individually.”  Id. at *18; see also Island Beyond, LLC v. Prime Capital Grp., LLC, No. 12 
CVS 7351, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 48, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2013) (noting that 
precedents allowing individual corporate shareholders to pursue actions do not necessarily 
apply to LLC members since members, but not shareholders, can alter the statutory default 
rules). 
 32. Blythe, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *16. 
 33. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a)(2) (amended 2014), with id. §§ 55-7-40 to 
-42. 
 34. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558−59 (N.C. 1983). 
 35. Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 139 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting 
that the complaining members were experienced businessmen who had accepted the funding 
9
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acknowledged that a single majority member might owe fiduciary duties to 
a minority member, but was unwilling to combine the two defendants’ 
ownership shares (16% and 50%) to find that collectively, they would owe 
a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs.36  Similarly, in another case, the business 
court was unwilling to find a fiduciary duty where the defendant did not 
own a majority of the “shares,” even though the plaintiff asserted that the 
defendant exercised control over a majority of the LLC’s “shares” and was 
able to squeeze the plaintiff out of the LLC’s management.37  Another 
recent opinion stated that “it does not automatically follow that a manager 
is accountable to an LLC’s members for management decisions solely 
because he holds a majority interest.”38 
In comparison, a North Carolina Business Court judge recently 
resolved a dispute among LLC members by reiterating that, in some cases, 
a group of minority shareholders in a closely held corporation “may be 
considered a majority . . . and that when their power of control is abused in 
those instances, a minority shareholder may need to be allowed to pursue 
claims individually despite the general rule that claims for harm to the 
corporation must be brought derivatively.”39 
An admission by a manager that he owed fiduciary duties to the 
members was ignored in one opinion as an incorrect legal conclusion.40  
Nonetheless, the argument can be made that this is what most managers 
probably believe, and thus, the courts might recognize this as reality. 
 
provided by Kaplan, owned controlling memberships, exercised their control, and had 
asserted that they controlled Kaplan). 
 36. BOGNC, LLC v. Cornelius NC Self-Storage, LLC, Nos. 10 CVS 19072, 10 CVS 
12371, 11 CVS 21122, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2013) (stating 
that “neither own[ed] a majority interest”). 
 37. Yates v. Brown, No. 11 CVS 14997, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *7–8 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 13, 2012); see also Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *33–
35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2013).  In Blythe, the court found that no de facto control existed 
where the defendant controlled a 30% member who, in turn, had control over the LLC’s 
accounting.  See id.  The court found that the plaintiff was a sophisticated business person 
who was an LLC manager and had access to the LLC’s financial information, and thus was 
not owed a fiduciary duty.  Id. 
 38. Island Beyond, LLC v. Prime Capital Grp., LLC, No. 12 CVS 7351, 2013 NCBC 
LEXIS 48, at *15–16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2013) (noting that the member’s claim for 
relief was not different from that which might be recoverable by the LLC in its derivative 
action). 
 39. Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *13–14 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 8, 2013). 
 40. BOGNC, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *1 n.2. 
10
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This “reality” was confirmed in RSN Properties, Inc. v. Jones.41  RSN 
Properties involved a dispute among four members of an LLC, with two 
members on each side of the dispute.42  The court noted that one side 
admitted that each member owed fiduciary duties to the other members.43  
The parties agreed that their duties ran to each other, not just to the LLC.  
One member also admitted that “a confidential relationship existed with 
fiduciary duties owed to one another.”44 
Although a plaintiff may have real problems in convincing a court that 
an LLC manager (or controlling member) owes a fiduciary duty to one or 
more of the LLC members, a few of the cases noted in this Part provide 
some hope to a complaining member. 
II. MAY A MEMBER SUE ON BEHALF OF THE LLC  
FOR AN INJURY TO THE LLC? 
What if a member of a five-member LLC misappropriates LLC funds?  
How should this dispute be resolved?45 
Most likely, in North Carolina, even if there are only a few members 
in the LLC, courts will refuse to allow one member to pursue an action on 
behalf of the LLC against a manager (or against another party running the 
LLC).  The North Carolina courts, based in part on former section 
 
 41. RSN Props., Inc. v. Jones, No. COA04-100, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 457, at *8–10 
(N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2005). 
 42. Id. at *2−5.  One “side” actually owned their membership through a corporation, 
but the opinion continually refers to the actual owners of this corporation in discussing the 
fiduciary duties that might have been owed.  Id. 
 43. Id. at *9 (“[E]ach [member] owed fiduciary duties to the other [members] to act 
with the utmost good faith in all matters and things affecting River Run [(the LLC)] and its 
management and operations, which included the duty to disclose all material facts relating to 
expenditures made by River Run and the assets of River Run.”). 
 44. Id. at *18.  However, in a more recent case, one 50% shareholder (and president) 
admitted in her answer that she owed fiduciary duties to the other 50% shareholder, but the 
court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that the defendant owed her a special duty 
or that her injuries were separate from that of the corporation, and thus denied her individual 
claims.  See LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *27–28 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012); LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2011 NCBC 
LEXIS 28, at *13–14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011). 
 45. Unless somehow modified by the operating agreement, such behavior would be a 
violation of section 57D-3-21(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes.  N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 57D-3-21(b) (amended 2014).  Note that the former LLC statute had additional provisions 
that arguably imposed more duties on the members and managers.  For a discussion of these 
now-repealed provisions, see Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock N.C., LLC, No. 07 
CVS 20852, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 32, at *10–15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009). 
11
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57C-3-23 of the North Carolina General Statutes,46 have routinely stated 
that one member cannot bring an action on behalf of the LLC unless a 
majority of the members (or the number required by the LLC’s operating 
agreement) approve the filing of the lawsuit.47  In the typical dispute, the 
defendants likely will own a majority of the interests and would obviously 
not agree to sue themselves.  But if the persons whom the plaintiff member 
wants the LLC to sue are the managers or co-members, it makes sense to 
disregard their votes in determining whose vote should be required to bring 
the suit.48 
Courts have now consistently stated, in response to a plaintiff 
member’s claim that she has the right, based on inherent agency principles, 
to cause the LLC to sue another member,49 that “filing a lawsuit is a 
management decision not related to the company’s usual course of 
business.”50  Therefore, the vote of those members or managers required by 
 
 46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-23 (repealed 2013) (“An act of a manager that is not 
apparently for carrying on the usual course of the business of the limited liability company 
does not bind the [LLC] unless authorized in fact or ratified by the [LLC].”).  The purpose 
of that section was to determine when a third party could bind an LLC by the acts of a 
member.  See, e.g., United States v. Jorick Mgmt., LLC, No 3:09CV275, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 63201, at *2−3 (W.D.N.C. June 14, 2011) (discussing whether a manager of a North 
Carolina LLC was authorized to borrow money and whether a third party knew of any 
limitation on the manager’s authority). 
 47. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705 
S.E.2d 757, 765–66 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33, 37–38 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008)); Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *30 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 4. 2013) (“Blythe appears to agree that bringing a direct action in Drymax’s 
name would require the approval, consent, agreement, or ratification of a majority of the 
managers . . . .”); see also Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 615 S.E.2d 1, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) 
(noting that one of two members could not cause the LLC to sue the other, because a 
majority vote to sue did not exist); Godwin v. Vinson, 111 S.E.2d 180, 180−81 (N.C. 1959) 
(stating that a partner cannot sue “in his own name, and for his benefit, upon a cause of 
action in favor of a partnership”). 
 48. See, e.g., 418 Meadow St. Assocs., LLC v. Clean Air Partners, LLC, 43 A.3d 607, 
616–17 (Conn. 2012) (applying a Connecticut statute that specifically requires a majority 
vote to sue, but likewise specifically excludes the vote of any member who has an adverse 
interest, finding that in a suit by an LLC (50% owned by Barbara Levine) against another 
LLC partly owned by Barbara’s husband, Barbara had an adverse interest and her vote not 
to sue her husband’s LLC should be disregarded); LeCann, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 28, at *8 
n.8 (“Plaintiff argues in the alternative, that even without demands, Plaintiff has standing to 
proceed directly as the only disinterested shareholder since Defendant Cobham is 
disqualified from acting with regard to such claims by virtue of her conflict of interest.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 37 (“Plaintiffs rely upon agency principles to argue 
that an LLC manager has ‘the inherent authority to authorize lawsuits to protect the LLC’s 
interests.’  Plaintiffs [also] cite N.C. Gen. Stat. § 57C-3-23 . . . .”). 
 50. Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10 CVS 6676, 2011 NCBC 
LEXIS 13, at *17 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 2011) (citing Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 37). 
12
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the operating agreement to file suit must be obtained.51  If the LLC has no 
operating agreement, only the “majority” members can bring such an 
action.52  As such, if the defendants constitute a majority of those in 
control, the LLC is barred from bringing a direct action against the 
defendants, no matter how egregious the behavior of the defendants might 
have been.  One opinion has also noted that if one member is allowed to 
bring an action on behalf of the LLC, what is to stop the defendant as a 
member from filing a motion to dismiss the action?53  However, this seems 
a much simpler way to quickly get to the merits of the dispute, rather than 
wandering through the complexities of a derivative suit discussed in Part 
IV.  The operating agreement could give the minority the right to bring 
such an action.  But even though this may be a very positive provision, it 
seems highly unlikely that operating agreements will be drafted to include 
this power. 
Former section 57C-3-23 has been deleted from the new Act, but no 
substantive change is apparently intended.54  Similar wording also exists in 
 
 51. See Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 37–38 (holding that because “the filing of an action by 
one manager of an LLC against a co-manager to recover purported assets of the LLC 
allegedly misappropriated by that co-manager [was] a management decision and [was] not 
‘carrying on in the usual way the business of the limited liability company,’” the suit could 
not be brought since it was not authorized.); cf. Stoker, 615 S.E.2d at 12–13 (noting that a 
50% member could not bring counterclaims in the name of the LLC against the other 50% 
member because a 51% vote would be required; the action could, however, be filed as a 
derivative claim or an individual direct action (citing Glisson Coker, Inc. v. Coker, 581 
S.E.2d 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003))). 
 52. See Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 765–66.  The court held that because a suit to recover 
allegedly misappropriated assets of the LLC is a management decision that requires 
approval by a majority of the LLC members, the plaintiffs, who did not constitute a 
majority, did not have authority to authorize the claims brought by the LLC.  Id. (quoting 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-23 (repealed 2013)).  Further, the court held that the majority-
member defendants had standing to bring counterclaims against the defendants.  Id. 
 53. Peak Coastal Ventures, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *20 n.6.  The court was actually 
commenting on language in the LLC’s operating agreement, but the point is equally 
applicable to whether section 57C-3-23 should be interpreted as limiting the right of a 
member to sue another member on behalf of the LLC.  The business court also noted that in 
order for the LLC to sue at the request of one member, the LLC would be required to obtain 
counsel, since a “corporation[] cannot represent [itself] in a lawsuit.”  Id. at *20.  The 
decision to hire counsel would also not be an act in the “usual course of business,” thus 
additionally requiring a majority vote (or whatever the operating agreement required) to hire 
counsel in order to pursue the action.  Id. at *17, *20. 
 54. In deleting this provision, the drafters of the revised North Carolina LLC Act note: 
“This section stated applicable principles of agency law.  As such it was duplicative of G.S. 
57C-10-03(c), which incorporates agency law by reference into the Act.”  Proposed Draft to 
Amend Chapter 57C of the North Carolina General Statutes at 35 n.99 (July 3, 2012) (on 
file with author). 
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the statutes of many other states55 and judges may continue to deny a 
member the right to cause the LLC to sue on the basis that a member does 
not have the implied authority nor the inherent power to sue.56  Courts may 
continue to assert that such a claim requires “express” authority—the 
appropriate approval of a majority of those in control or of those 
individuals who are specified in the operating agreement.57  The bottom 
line seems to be that if a minority member feels that those in control have 
injured the LLC, she will be unable to pursue a direct claim on behalf of 
the LLC. 
III. WHAT IF A MANAGER BREACHES A DUTY OWED  
DIRECTLY TO A MEMBER? 
As noted above, even though one’s status as a manager does not create 
duties to the members, a manager (or member) may owe fiduciary duties to 
members based on the behavior and relationship between the manager and 
members.  If the manager (or, for example, a controlling member) does 
breach a duty owed specifically to the member, can the injured member 
directly sue and recover for her injuries? 
A. Barger Rule 
The first restriction on the member’s ability to bring a direct suit to 
recover for injuries suffered as a member is the Barger rule, which 
provides that shareholders and limited partners may not bring an individual 
action against a third party for an injury directly affecting the individual, if 
the entity has a cause of action arising out of the same wrong.58  This 
common-law limitation has been carried over into the world of LLCs.59 
Under the Barger rule, the individual may bring a direct action only if 
she can show either (1) that the wrongdoer owed her a special duty,60 or (2) 
 
 55. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a)(2), 6B U.L.A. 585 (2014).  The 1996 act has 
been adopted in eight states and in the Virgin Islands.  See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, 6B 
U.L.A. 93 (West Supp. 2014). 
 56. Cf. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:2, at 646–47. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 488 S.E.2d 215, 220 (N.C. 1997); see also 
Energy Inv’rs Fund, L.P. v Metric Constructors, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 441, 444–45 (N.C. 2000); 
BDM Invs. v. Lenhil, Inc., No. 11 CVS 449, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *27–28 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 18, 2012) (noting that the Barger rule applies to general partnerships). 
 59. See Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *15–17 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2013). 
 60. See Morris v. Hennon & Brown Props., LLC, No. 1:07CV780, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 55963, at *17–18 (M.D.N.C. July 3, 2008) (finding that a member failed to make 
14
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that the injury suffered by the individual is separate and distinct from the 
injury sustained by the other shareholders or partners, or by the entity 
itself.61  A few cases have found this special duty (entitling an individual 
member to a direct suit) where the defendant is the controlling owner.62  
The exception is unlikely to extend to a plaintiff who is a 50% owner being 
controlled by the other 50% owner.63  A 50% “minority” owner does not 
face insurmountable hurdles posed by suing derivatively, since she can 
automatically create a deadlock, which will afford her greater opportunity 
to bring a direct suit for dissolution.64 
 
any allegations of a special duty owed only to the member and refusing to assume that 
former section 57C-3-22(b) created a duty); McKee v. James, No. 09 CVS 3031, 2013 
NCBC LEXIS 33, at *19–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013) (finding a special duty by 
virtue of longstanding personal relationship could not be asserted because the plaintiffs only 
knew the defendants for four months). 
 61. McKee, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *21 n.8 (“[T]he allegations also reveal a separate 
and distinct injury.  Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, in addition to the injuries they 
sustained as shareholders, they also lost their positions as managers and officers of the 
company.”); LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *27–28 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012) (discussing that the plaintiff suffered a fiscal injury, but that 
it was the proximate result of her status as a shareholder, and thus, she failed to meet the 
requirement of either exception); Regions Bank v. Reg’l Prop. Dev. Corp., No. 07 CVS 
12469, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 8, at *13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2008).  In Regions Bank, a 
member failed to plead a separate and distinct injury by asserting that alleged wrongful acts 
forced the member to agree to a modification of the LLC operating agreement and to an 
improper payment of $600,000 to other members, thus reducing its equity in the LLC.  Id. at 
*14.  The claim was, in reality, a claim that members wrongfully diverted LLC assets—an 
entity claim.  Id. at *14–15.  Treating this as an individual claim could impair the rights of 
creditors.  Id. at *15. 
 62. See, e.g., Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 258–59 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000); McKee, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *19 (holding that a special duty 
runs to those who are powerless because of the legal impediments to their dissolving the 
company or because a derivative recovery will be in the hands of the wrongdoers, but also 
that the court must consider both the impact of an individual owner’s recovery on the 
business creditors and the danger of multiple lawsuits).  But see Blythe, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 
17, at *15–20 (finding that the black-letter rule was not established, and noting that cases 
turn on particular facts). 
 63. See Mauer v. Mauer, No. 13 CVS 4421, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 41, at *11–12 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 23 2013) (first citing Allen v. Ferrera, 540 S.E.2d 761, 766 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2000); then citing Outen v. Mical, 454 S.E.2d 883, 885–86 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)).  Contra 
LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 28, at *13–14 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 2, 2011) (finding in LeCann the exception based more on the fact that 50/50 
shareholders operated as partners). 
 64. Mauer, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 41, at *11–12; see also supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
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Questions have been raised regarding when the defendant is a “third 
party” that triggers these two limitations.65  Delaware, the Revised Uniform 
LLC Act of 2006, and the ABA’s Revised Prototype LLC Act have all 
recently rejected the requirement that the plaintiff’s injury must be distinct 
from those of the other shareholders for the plaintiff to bring a direct suit.66 
B. Second Restriction 
In addition to the limitations imposed by the Barger rule, former 
section 57C-3-30(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes, as applied by 
the North Carolina courts, imposed another restriction on the ability of a 
member to bring a direct suit to recover for her individual injuries.67  The 
purpose of this statute is reasonably self-evident—a member is not liable 
for the wrongs of the LLC merely by being a member, and thus should not 
be joined in any action unless the member is suing or being sued by the 
LLC.68  However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals greatly expanded 
the reach of former section 57C-3-30(b) as authority to limit an LLC 
member’s right to bring an individual direct claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty against another member or manager.  Because the language of this 
 
 65. Norman, 537 S.E.2d at 253; cf. Gaskin v. J.S. Procter Co., 675 S.E.2d 115, 119–21 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that Norman did not create a new special exception as to when 
a minority shareholder or member might be entitled to bring an individual direct action). 
 66. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036, 1038–39 (Del. 
2004); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 901 (amended 2013), 6B U.L.A. 522 (2014) 
(this is the model that the North Carolina drafters used and intentionally omitted this 
provision); REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 909(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); see 
also Marcoux v. Prim, No. 04 CVS 920, 2004 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 
16, 2004) (cautiously concluding that the plaintiff’s class action challenge to a merger was a 
direct claim, since the injury was the shareholders receiving less than they should; “[t]he 
treasury of the shareholder is depleted, not the treasury of the corporation”). 
 67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30(b) (repealed 2013) (providing that “[a] member of a 
limited liability company is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a limited liability 
company, except where the object of the proceeding is to enforce a member’s right against 
or liability to the limited liability company”). 
 68. Page v. Roscoe, LLC, 497 S.E.2d 422, 428 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a 
claim against the LLC was proper, but disallowing a suit against a member of the LLC who 
did not engage in any improper acts); see also Selvidio v. Gillespie (In re Gillespie), Ch. 11 
Case No. 10-30942, Adv. No. 10-3187, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1261, at *12–13 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2012).  The court in Selvidio held that a suit “against an individual 
member of an LLC in an attempt to collect money owed [to] the LLC [by] another member 
[was] a violation of North Carolina law.”  Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30(b) 
(repealed 2013)).  The plaintiff lacked standing to sue because she had not “asserted the 
existence of a special duty owed by [the defendant manager] that [was] personal, separate, 
and distinct from the duty that [the defendant] owed the company,” and her claim should 
have been brought as a derivative suit.  Id. 
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/1
2015] RESOLVING LLC MEMBER DISPUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA 241 
statute has been adopted in at least seventeen other states,69 the implication 
of the following North Carolina decisions may still have substantial impact 
in these other states, which, in some instances, similarly applied their 
statute as a limitation.70 
In Crouse v. Mineo,71 one member of a two-member LLC law firm 
attempted to directly assert that the other LLC member breached fiduciary 
duties that amounted to unfair or deceptive acts, since the defendant had a 
special relationship of trust and confidence with the plaintiff that 
constituted a fiduciary relationship by virtue of their membership in the 
LLC.72  The court agreed with the defendant’s argument that former section 
57C-3-30(b) barred the plaintiff’s claims because “[a]ll of the allegations 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty . . . relate[d] to the parties’ relationship 
through [the law firm].”73  Because the claims were through the LLC, they 
had to be brought on behalf of the LLC; the plaintiff, as only one member, 
was not authorized to sue on behalf of the LLC.  Interestingly, the court 
allowed the plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim against the defendant, 
 
 69. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-305 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(j) 
(2003 & Supp. 2014); IND. CODE § 23-18-3-5 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(C) 
(2013); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-302 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 79-29-311(2) (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 347.069(1) (2000 & Supp. 2014); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 86.381 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-14 (2014); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW 
§ 610 (McKinney 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-133 (2012); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 8991(b) (2001 & Supp. 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-70 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 47-34A-201 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-114(c) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.1-1020 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 183.0305 (2014). 
 70. United States v. All Funds in the Account of Prop. Futures, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 
1305, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing FLA. STAT. § 608.462 (2014)).  The court explained that 
the minority members of an LLC could not challenge a government civil forfeiture of 
property owned by the LLC.  The members had no standing, since they had no direct 
ownership interest in the forfeited LLC property, and thus, they were “not a proper party to 
proceedings by an LLC.”  Id.; see also Baron v. Rocketboom, LLC, Nos. 4777N, 
601066/07, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9352, at *1–2 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 9, 2008) 
(noting that a similar statute prohibited LLC member from intervening); Katz v. Katz, No. 
2007-06043, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS, at *7 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 14, 2008) (applying a 
similar statute to hold that a husband could not individually bring an action against his 
former wife asserting that she was wrongly occupying a home owned by the husband’s 
LLC), rev’d in part on other grounds, El-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan, No. 2011-09178, 2013 N.Y. 
App. Div. LEXIS 8347, at *23–24 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 18, 2013); 450 W. 14th St. Corp. v. 
40-56 Tenth Ave. L.L.C., No. 602527/00, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 98, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 28, 2001) (holding that “a member of a company . . . is not a proper party to an action 
against the company”). 
 71. Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 72. Id. at 42. 
 73. Id. at 41–42. 
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essentially finding that it was not based on rights derived through the 
parties’ membership in the LLC.74 
In 2011, the North Carolina Court of Appeals again confirmed that 
former section 57C-3-30(b) effectively prevented members from bringing 
individual direct claims against another member or manager where the 
claims were based on the duties that arose as part of the LLC—as certainly 
most all breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims will be.75 
C. New Law—Same Result? 
The limitations of the Barger rule continue to apply after the adoption 
of the revised LLC act.  However, since former section 57C-3-30(b) has 
been deleted from the new LLC act, will this mean that, assuming there is 
an individual duty created through the LLC relationship and that the duty 
was breached, the injured member can now bring a claim directly?  There 
is no comparable provision in the 2013 LLC act, and the only provision 
that may be remotely related is section 57D-2-32, which permits duties and 
expands remedies to be provided in the operating agreement.76  Will courts 
look to new section 57D-2-32 not only as a possible limitation on the 
creation of common-law fiduciary duties, but also as a limitation in the 
 
 74. Id.  It should be noted that the defendant asserted that the LLC only existed as a 
marketing tool, and that only cases obtained through it would be shared.  See Brief of 
Defendant-Appellee at 4–7, Crouse, 658 S.E.2d 33 (No. COA07-344).  The defendant 
asserted that no cases were obtained by the LLC and that the cases in question were never 
handled by the LLC.  Id.  As such, the plaintiff would have no rights to any fees under any 
theory asserted by him. 
 75. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705 
S.E.2d 757, 766 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).  The court of appeals also concluded that the 
plaintiffs’ accounting claim should likewise be dismissed: “[a]s this duty is also ‘relate[d] to 
the parties’ relationship’ as part of the PLLC, it is not a proper individual claim pursuant to 
Crouse.”  Id. at 767 (second alteration in original) (quoting Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 42). 
 76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-32 (amended 2014).  The statute provides: 
(a) An operating agreement may subject interest owners and other persons who 
are parties to or otherwise bound by the operating agreement to specified remedies 
for breach of the operating agreement or the occurrence of a specified event.  Such 
remedies may include the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees, the assessment 
of interest without the assessment being subject to the laws of usury, and the 
imposition of penalties that would otherwise be unenforceable as stipulated or 
liquidated damages. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, an interest owner or 
other person who is a party to or bound by the operating agreement will not be 
liable to the LLC or an interest owner or other person who is a party to the 
operating agreement for that person’s reliance on the provisions of the operating 
agreement. 
Id. 
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manner that any such duties may be enforced?  Nothing in this new section 
specifically provides such a limitation, but only time will tell how it may be 
applied.  The failure of the legislature to adopt section 9.01 of the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act, which specifically permits a member to 
bring a direct action, is certainly a signal that such actions continue to be 
disfavored, absent specific authorization in the LLC operating agreement.77 
IV. DERIVATIVE SUITS AS THE SOLUTION? 
A. When Is a Derivative Suit Permitted? 
The LLC member who believes that she has been injured, but cannot 
bring a direct suit, may almost always bring a derivative action, no matter 
how cumbersome,78 even though the North Carolina Court of Appeals has 
pointed out that this is an inappropriate method for resolving disputes 
among members of a closely held business.79 
New section 57D-3-21(b) continues to require each manager to 
discharge her duties “(i) in good faith, (ii) with the care an ordinary prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, and 
(iii) subject to the operating agreement, in a manner the manager believes 
to be in the best interests of the LLC.”80  If she fails in these duties, the 
LLC has standing to complain.81  However, these duties can be modified or 
possibly eliminated by a contrary provision in the operating agreement.82  
New sections 57D-8-01 through 57D-8-07 of the North Carolina General 
 
 77. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 901 (amended 2013), 6B U.L.A. 522 (2014).  
The North Carolina drafters initially considered this revised uniform act as a model or 
guide, and omitted this provision.  See supra note 54. 
 78. See, e.g., Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10 CVS 6676, 2011 
NCBC LEXIS 13, at *21–22 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 2011). 
 79. See Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 258–60 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2000). 
 80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-21(b).  Unlike the leading State of Delaware, and many 
other states that impose liability only if the director acted in a grossly negligent manner, 
North Carolina corporate directors and presumably North Carolina managers operating 
under identical statutory language may be liable if they merely act negligently.  See FDIC v. 
Willetts, 882 F. Supp. 2d 859, 868 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (“[T]he Court finds that its holding that 
the corporation may bring suit against its directors and officers for ordinary negligence is 
not clearly erroneous.”). 
 81. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-8-01 to -07. 
 82. See id. § 57D-2-30(b).  This section lists those provisions that the operating 
agreement may not “supplant, vary, disclaim, or nullify.”  Id.  Section 57D-3-21(b) is not 
included in this list of mandatory provisions.  Id. 
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Statutes authorize LLC members to bring derivative suits if all the required 
conditions discussed in Section C of this Part are met.83 
B. Whose Law Controls? 
It is well established that whether a plaintiff’s claim for breach of a 
fiduciary duty may be brought directly or must be brought derivatively is 
clearly governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the LLC is 
organized.84  Likewise, the LLC’s state of organization governs whether the 
managers are liable to the members.85  It is less clear which aspects of the 
derivative requirements of the foreign state should be applied in pursuing 
the derivative claim in North Carolina.86   
In Scott v. Lackey,87 the business court applied Delaware law in 
determining whether the plaintiff was an “adequate” party.88  Should the 
court have applied Delaware law, since there was no adequacy requirement 
for a plaintiff to pursue a derivative action under North Carolina law?89 
Prior to the 2013 amendments, North Carolina Business Court judges 
stated that they would follow the Delaware “procedural prerequisites” if the 
LLC was a Delaware LLC.90  The new North Carolina LLC statute, similar 
 
 83. Id. §§ 57D-8-01 to -07; see also infra notes 93–111 and accompanying text. 
 84. Maurer v. SlickEdit, Inc., No. 04 CVS 10527, 2005 NCBC LEXIS 2, at *12 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. May 16, 2005) (“Under North Carolina law, if a derivative claim is asserted 
against a foreign corporation the courts of this state look to the laws of the state in which the 
company is incorporated to determine the procedural prerequisites and whether the claim is 
derivative or individual.”); see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the 
Law of Limited Liability Companies, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 70 n.20 (2006) (listing cases 
that have applied the rule). 
 85. Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 652 S.E.2d 231, 235 (N.C. 2007). 
 86. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 2:13, at 235–58, § 4:2, at 354–84 (2014) (discussing choice-of-law issues that 
arise in shareholder derivative actions). 
 87. Scott v. Lackey, No. 11 CVS 19560, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 60 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 
3, 2012). 
 88. Id. at *2. 
 89. Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *31 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 4, 2013); 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17–18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2013).  The court 
noted that although in a North Carolina corporate dispute the derivative plaintiff must be an 
adequate representative, nothing in the former LLC statute included this requirement.  N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 57C-8-01 (repealed 2013).  The same is true under the new LLC statute, N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01 (amended 2014).  The business court in Blythe also noted that the 
member “is not barred from bring[ing] such an action by his individual conflict of interest.”  
Blythe, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *32. 
 90. See, e.g., Maurer v. SlickEdit, Inc., No. 04 CVS 10527, 2005 NCBC LEXIS 2, at 
*12 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 16, 2005); see also supra note 84. 
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to the existing corporate statute,91 now provides reasonably clear guidance 
on this: 
In any derivative proceeding in the right of a foreign LLC, the matters 
covered by this Article will be governed by the law of the jurisdiction of 
the foreign LLC’s organization except for the matters governed by G.S. 
57D-8-02 [(court may stay proceedings)], 57D-8-04 [(discontinuance or 
settlement requires court approval)], and 57D-8-05 [(payment of 
expenses)].92 
Thus, in any member dispute, the first question will be, “Where is the LLC 
organized?” 
C. What Are the New Required Procedures? 
The 2013 LLC act has modified the requirements for bringing an LLC 
derivative action.93  In an attempt to mirror the provisions governing 
corporate derivative actions, the following procedures are now required for 
an LLC member to bring a derivative action on behalf of the LLC: 
(1) The plaintiff must first make a written demand on the LLC to 
take action.94  There is no “futility” exception.  The plaintiff 
 
 91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-47 (2013); see Aubin v. Susi, 560 S.E.2d 875, 880–81 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (applying the North Carolina statute rather than New York law to 
determine that a derivative plaintiff could recover attorney’s fees, even though the plaintiff 
was not a successful litigant). 
 92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-06 (amended 2014); see id. §§ 57D-8-02, -04, -05. 
 93. Id. §§ 57D-8-01 to -07; see Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 
10 CVS 6676, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *21–22 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 2011) (describing 
the former procedures). 
 94. Green v. Condra, No. 08 CVS 6575, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 20, at *16 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 14, 2009) (“A plaintiff’s failure to satisfy this demand requirement constitutes an 
‘insurmountable bar’ to recovery.” (quoting Allen v. Ferrera, 540 S.E.2d 761, 764 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2000))); see also Ray v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., No. 05 CVS 15862, 2006 NCBC 
LEXIS 7, at *20–24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2006) (stating that if there is no existing body 
upon which demand can be made, the plaintiff may first be required to cause an appropriate 
body to be selected); Garlock v. Hilliard, No. 00-CVS-1018, 2000 NCBC LEXIS 6, at *12–
13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2000) (noting that where the plaintiffs and defendant had 
conflicting interests, a demand was still required so that an independent advisory committee 
could be appointed to decide what claims the corporation should pursue and against which 
parties); Greene v. Shoemaker, No. 97 CVS 2118, 1998 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *12–16 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1998) (discussing the purposes of the demand requirement); cf. 
Chrystall v. Serden Techs., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citations omitted) 
(concluding that “demand ‘must be made upon the board of directors or comparable 
authority’ and ‘making a demand on a president and corporate legal counsel is not 
sufficient’”). 
21
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must also plead that a demand was made.95  The business court 
has recently explained what is required of the demand.96 
(2) The subsequent action must be brought by a member.97  
However, unlike the corporate procedures, an LLC member is 
not required to demonstrate that she fairly represents the 
interests of the LLC.98 
(3) The plaintiff must have been a member at the time of the act on 
which the complaint is based (or her membership interest must 
have devolved on her from a member who meets this 
requirement).99 
 
 95. Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 263 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2000) (stating that a description of the demand is still required in pleading, but that it may 
be sufficient for the plaintiff to plead that all conditions precedent to filing an action have 
been performed or have occurred). 
 96. The court in LeCann v. Cobham explained what is required of the demand as 
follows: “The form of the demand is not specified, except to require that it be in writing; but 
to serve its purpose it should set forth the facts of share ownership and describe the redress 
demanded with enough particularity to allow the corporation either to correct the problem, if 
any, without a lawsuit or to bring its own direct action.”  LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 
11169, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 28, at *9–10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011) (quoting RUSSELL 
M. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW § 17.03[1], at 17-13 (7th 
ed. 2009)).  Further, “[i]n determining whether the demand requirement has been met the 
Court must compare the derivative claims asserted in a complaint against the specific 
demands a plaintiff has made prior to filing suit.”  Id. at *10 (quoting Garlock, 2000 NCBC 
LEXIS 6, at *9).  “The demand must be made with sufficient clarity and particularity to 
permit the corporation to assess its rights and obligations and determine what action is in the 
best interest of the company.”  Id. (citing Garlock, 2000 NCBC LEXIS 6, at *9); see also 
Greene, 1998 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *9 (“The demand must be made with sufficient clarity and 
particularity to permit the corporation, through independent directors or an outside advisory 
committee, to assess its rights and obligations and determine what action is in the best 
interest of the company.”). 
 97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a); see also Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock 
N.C., LLC, No. 07 CVS 20852, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 32, at *19–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 
13, 2009) (stating that under prior law, the plaintiff had to assert that she did not have 
standing to cause the LLC to sue, and thus, a member’s minority status at least gave her 
standing to bring the derivative claim). 
 98. See Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 8, 2013).  The court notes that, different from a corporate derivative suit, under the 
former LLC statute, the member did not have to demonstrate that she fairly represented the 
interests of the LLC.  This remains true under section 57D-8-01.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 57D-8-01. 
 99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a); see infra notes 126–51 and accompanying text 
(noting that a beneficiary of a deceased member will rarely have standing to bring the 
22
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(4) The plaintiff must wait either ninety days or until the LLC has 
notified her that it is rejecting the demand before she can file 
suit.100  The complaint must be verified by oath.101 
(5) Unless the defendants never reject the demand and do not move 
to dismiss, the plaintiff at some point will be required to plead 
“particular facts” that would demonstrate either (i) that an 
inappropriate group102 moved to dismiss (or rejected the 
demand), or (ii) that there was a failure to make an appropriate 
and adequate inquiry into whether the action is not in the best 
interests of the LLC.103 
(6) Prior to a court ruling, the plaintiff may engage in discovery 
only to the extent it is germane and necessary to develop facts 
 
action; since the membership does not “devolve” on the beneficiary, only the deceased 
member’s economic interest is transferred). 
 100. The statute also permits the member to bring the action earlier if irreparable injury 
to the LLC would result by waiting.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a)(2)(iii).  However, it is 
highly unlikely that these grounds will be asserted.  The court of appeals has stated that the 
action must be commenced within ninety days after the demand is made.  See Allen v. 
Ferrera, 540 S.E.2d 761, 765 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). 
 101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 23(b) (2013); see Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445, 
448 (N.C. 1990) (citations omitted) (“Because the rule containing the verification 
requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, where the purposes behind the rule have been 
fulfilled by the time the objection to a defective or absent verification is lodged, dismissal or 
summary judgment in favor of defendants is not appropriate.”). 
 102. The motion to dismiss must be made by either: (1) a majority vote of independent 
persons who have authority to cause the LLC to bring the recovery requested in the 
derivative suit, (2) a majority vote of independent committee members, or (3) an 
independent panel appointed by the court.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-8-03(b), (f) (amended 
2014). 
 103. Id. at § 57D-8-03(d).  Section 57D-8-03 states, in relevant part: 
If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination has been made 
rejecting a demand by a member, the complaint must allege particular facts that if 
proved would preclude the court from dismissing the derivative proceeding under 
subsection (a) of this section [automatic dismissal if an independent body moves 
to dismiss after conducting an inquiry].  Defendants may make a motion to 
dismiss a complaint under subsection (a) of this section for failure to comply with 
this subsection. 
Id.  The statute at this point is confusing as to when the plaintiff must plead “particular 
facts,” as well as who has the burden of proof as to subsections (i) and (ii).  These are 
discussed more fully below.  See infra notes 179–97 and accompanying text. 
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that establish that the dismissal of the derivative proceeding is 
unwarranted.104 
(7) If the LLC commences an inquiry into the allegations set forth 
in the demand or complaint, the court may stay the proceedings. 
(8) In determining whether to dismiss, apparently the court only 
needs to evaluate whether those acting were independent and 
that appropriate procedures were followed.105  The court does 
not evaluate the substance of the decision.  “The court shall 
dismiss a derivative proceeding on motion of the LLC if one of 
the groups [designated in the statute] . . . determines after 
conducting an inquiry106 upon which its conclusions are 
based107 that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not 
 
 104. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[5], at 17-35 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing 
problems created by this provision, which severely limit the plaintiff’s ability to obtain 
likely needed information). 
 105. Cf. Madvig v. Gaither, 461 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (“The inquiry of 
a court reviewing the corporation’s decision not to pursue the proposed litigation is limited 
to determining whether: (1) the decision was made by ‘a committee consisting of two or 
more independent directors’; (2) a reasonable inquiry was conducted; and (3) the decision 
was made in good faith.” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-44(b)(2) (2013))).  The LLC 
statute does not require “good faith.”  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-08(a) (amended 2014); 
see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013) (“[S]ection 
7.44 does not authorize the court to review the reasonableness of the determination to reject 
a demand or seek dismissal.”).   
 106. The official comment to the Model Business Corporation Act states: 
 The word “inquiry”—rather than “investigation”—has been used to make it 
clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend upon the issues raised and the 
knowledge of the group making the determination with respect to those issues.  In 
some cases, the issues may be so simple or the knowledge of the group so 
extensive that little additional inquiry is required.  In other cases, the group may 
need to engage counsel and possibly other professionals to make an investigation 
and assist the group in its evaluation of the issues. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 cmt. 2. 
 107. The ABA goes on to say: 
 The phrase “upon which its conclusions are based” requires that the inquiry 
and the conclusions follow logically.  This standard authorizes the court to 
examine the determination to ensure that it has some support in the findings of the 
inquiry. . . . This phrase does not require the persons making the determination to 
prepare a written report that sets forth their determination and the bases therefor, 
since circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report.  There will be, in all 
likelihood, many instances where good corporate practice will commend such a 
procedure. 
Id.  
24
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in the best interest of the LLC.”108 
(9) Unlike the comparable North Carolina corporate derivative 
statute, the LLC derivative statute does not require those acting 
to dismiss to act in “good faith.”109  One might wonder what the 
significance of this deletion will be.110 
The clear thrust of the new LLC act is to force all disputes among 
members and managers to be resolved through derivative suits.  For 
instance, section 57D-2-30(b)(5) states that the operating agreement may 
not eliminate a member’s right “to bring a derivative action under Article 8 
of [chapter 57] unless the operating agreement provides an alternative 
remedy, which may include the right to bring a direct action in lieu of a 
derivative action or modifying the procedures provided in Article 8 of 
[chapter 57] governing derivative actions.”111 
Other than an action to dissolve the LLC, discussed in Part V.B of this 
Article,112 nowhere else in the new act is there any provision for other 
methods of resolving disputes among members and managers. 
D. What Problems Are Created by the Requirement that Disputes Among 
LLC Members and Managers Must Be Resolved Through a Derivative 
Suit? 
The leading state treatise on corporation law, Robinson on North 
Carolina Corporation Law, provides a checklist of corporate steps, easily 
modified to fit the LLC context, that can be taken to defeat the derivative 
claim.113  But there is much more to consider. 
1.  The statute is procedurally confusing as to how a demand is 
rejected and how a motion to dismiss is to be filed and evaluated 
The statute first states in section 57D-8-01(a)(1) that the LLC shall 
notify the plaintiff that her demand has been rejected, but does not say how 
or who makes this decision.  However, section 57D-08-03(d) implies that 
any rejection must be made by independent members (or managers) 
 
 108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(a). 
 109. Compare id. § 55-7-44, with id. § 57D-8-03. 
 110. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[3], at 17-33 (7th ed. 2014) (“The concept of 
‘good faith’ is a subjective one that modifies both the inquiry and the conclusion . . . .”). 
 111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-30(b)(5). 
 112. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 113. ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[6], at 17-35 to -37. 
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concluding, after conducting an inquiry, that the derivative proceeding is 
not in the best interests of the LLC.114 
Unless some sort of report is furnished to the plaintiff, she likely will 
have no information as to whether the two requirements have been met.  
How will the plaintiff know whether she must plead facts to contest either 
issue?  Luckily, limited discovery may be permitted,115 but again, in a 
confusing way, the statute states that the discovery could only be in regard 
to a motion to dismiss.116  At this stage of the litigation, there is not even a 
complaint.  Note that none of this will apply if the demand is not rejected 
and the ninety-day clock has run.117 
At the pleading stage, the ultimate questions will be (1) whether the 
rejection was made by an independent body, and (2) whether there was an 
 
 114. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(d), which requires the complaint to plead 
particular facts that “if proved would preclude the court from dismissing the derivative 
proceeding under subsection (a)”—that either those moving were not independent or that 
they failed to make an adequate inquiry.  Further, if the complaint does not so plead, this can 
be grounds for a motion to dismiss.  Id. 
 115. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[5], at 17-35.  Robinson explains: 
The [very similar corporate] North Carolina statute contains an unusual provision 
stating that, prior to the court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff shall 
be limited to preliminary discovery only with respect to the issues presented by 
the motion and only if and to the extent that the plaintiff has alleged the required 
facts with particularity. . . . This extraordinarily tight limitation on discovery was 
obviously intended to control expenses and deter strike suits.  It places on a party 
who may have limited or no personal knowledge of some essential facts, and 
virtually no source of information other than a request for record inspection, the 
burden of pleading those facts with particularity, and perhaps also the burden of 
proving them, for purposes of the dismissal motion.  If a court concludes that this 
combination of discovery limitation and burden of pleading/proof unreasonably 
blocks a plaintiff whose case may have merit, the court might respond by relaxing 
either the discovery limitation or the “particularity” requirement. 
Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-04 (specifying an LLC member’s inspection rights).  
Contra Halebian v. Berv, 869 F. Supp. 2d 420, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing why the 
court rejects the plaintiff’s request for discovery regarding independence and reasonable 
inquiry). 
 116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(d). 
 117. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  However, it may be possible to read 
the statute to also permit the LLC to reject a demand in any manner that would be consistent 
with the operating agreement, e.g., majority vote, regardless of whether those rejecting the 
demand are independent.  It is likely that this will commonly happen.  The statute then 
might suggest that the plaintiff is free to file the complaint without worrying about whether 
there was a disinterested rejection or whether a proper inquiry was made.  However, after 
the complaint is filed, presumably the defendants could then file the motion to dismiss, and 
then the plaintiff is required to plead (possibly through an amended complaint) particular 
facts attacking either the lack of independence or failure to conduct an appropriate inquiry.  
If the defendants fail to reject the demand, this second procedure would seem to apply. 
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adequate inquiry.  The burden of proof on these two questions depends on 
whether a majority of the persons who have the authority to cause the LLC 
to sue for the wrongs asserted in the complaint are independent.  If 
independent, the burden is on the plaintiff; if not, it is on the defendants.118  
This raises several questions: How does the court determine who has the 
burden?  What is the procedure?119  Should the plaintiff assert that she does 
not have the burden, since the majority of the LLC are not independent, or 
should the defendants in a motion assert that they are?  This certainly adds 
a degree of complexity to the whole process.  Note that this is borrowed 
from the corporate statute, where it may often be a lot clearer whether the 
board is generally independent, assuming that the board may consist of 
many members who had nothing to do with an alleged wrongdoing by an 
officer or co-director.  With the typical closely held LLC, this is simply not 
the case—this will not be the structure of the organization. 
The statute also gives the LLC the right to ask the court to appoint an 
independent panel.120  The immediate problem is determining who votes to 
request this independent panel. Does the plaintiff have a vote? The 
Robinson treatise then raises a second problem—at this early stage, there is 
no court to make the appointment.121 
These provisions have been adopted from the corporate derivative 
statutes. Unfortunately, there is little clarification in the corporate 
derivative world for how all of this should play out.122 
 
 118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(e). 
 119. See Sojitz Am. Capital Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 574–75 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2013) (applying a nearly identical Connecticut statute, noting that the decision whether the 
majority are “qualified” is the threshold issue, but giving no description as to how the court 
is to proceed in making this determination); Halebian, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (applying the 
nearly identical Massachusetts statute, but again omitting any discussion of how to 
determine who has the burden). 
 120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(f). 
 121. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[6], at 17-37.  Robinson points out: 
[T]he use of a court-appointed panel before actual commencement of the action 
would be problematic because there would at that time be no lawsuit or designated 
court in which to file the motion for appointment of the panel, thus leaving a 
corporation that wishes to use such a panel with a choice of either trying to get the 
appointment in a declaratory judgment action filed by it or doing only preliminary 
work during the 90-day waiting period and filing the motion for appointment after 
commencement of the action. 
Id. 
 122. In Madvig v. Gaither, 461 F. Supp. 2d 398 (W.D.N.C. 2006), following the 
essentially identical corporate derivative statutory required procedures, the plaintiff made a 
demand on a corporation, the corporation then immediately put a special litigation 
committee in place, the complaint was filed, the committee report was then subsequently 
filed requesting dismissal, and the court ultimately dismissed the complaint, finding that the 
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2.  Inadvertent failure to carefully follow the rules—particularly 
when the plaintiffs assume that they may proceed directly 
There are plenty of instances where a member has directly asserted a 
claim against a manager, not realizing that it should have been a derivative 
claim.  When this occurs, a court is likely to simply dismiss the claim.123  
On occasion, however, courts have taken a more liberal approach and 
essentially converted the direct suit into a derivative action.124  In one case, 
the court of appeals noted that although the lawsuit was essentially a 
derivative suit and neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants had recognized 
it as such, the court was willing to proceed without addressing the issues 
that might be posed by the fact that it was a derivative suit.125  Despite 
these plaintiff “victories,” it seems likely that we will continue to see cases 
brought directly that ultimately are deemed derivative, resulting in early 
dismissals. 
3.  Plaintiff is not a member at the time the action is filed or the LLC 
is no longer in existence 
In order to sue, the plaintiff must be a member.126  The issue of 
whether the plaintiff was still a member when he sued was improperly 
 
committee met the requirements of the statute.  Id. at 402–04, 410–11.  There is no 
discussion in the opinion as to how the plaintiff challenged the committee’s independence or 
inquiry procedurally.  In Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000), again applying the identical corporate derivative statute, the court 
noted that the plaintiff may not commence an action until the statutory period has elapsed 
following demand, and at that point, the corporation’s independent directors may then 
determine that the suit is not in the best interests of the corporation.  Id. at 253. 
 123. Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10 CVS 6676, 2011 NCBC 
LEXIS 13, at *23–24 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 2011).  The plaintiffs failed to properly plead 
a derivative claim, since nothing in the complaint stated that the plaintiffs asked the 
defendant member to explain his actions, rectify the wrong, or authorize suit.  See id.  The 
plaintiffs also failed to verify the complaint.  Id. 
 124. Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33, 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that the 
complaint could support a derivative action even though a plaintiff did not intend to proceed 
derivatively, since it factually asserted all of the then-required elements for a derivative 
claim); see also Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2013) (“A court may employ a liberal standard to find a derivative action 
on behalf of a LLC has been stated even though the plaintiff made no effort to label it as 
such.” (citing Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 40)). 
 125. T-WOL Acquisition Co. v. ECDG S., LLC, 725 S.E.2d 605, 609–10 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a)(1) (amended 2014).  See generally BISHOP & 
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, ¶ 10.07[1][a], at 10-49 n.224 (discussing situations where 
persons were and were not deemed members, and thus, did or did not have standing to bring 
a derivative action). 
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raised in Crouse v. Mineo,127 but more serious allegations were raised in 
Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. 
Brewer.128  The defendants in Brewer argued that the plaintiffs, in leaving 
their law firm, had withdrawn from the firm and could not subsequently 
bring a derivative suit.129  The plaintiffs countered that although they had 
started their own new firm (among other indicia of withdrawal), they had 
not technically “withdrawn” within the meaning of the former North 
Carolina LLC statute.130  Rather, their actions caused the law firm to 
dissolve.131  Thus, as the firm was in wind-up, the plaintiffs would still be 
deemed members.132   
The court noted that under the former statute, “[a] member [could] 
withdraw only at the time or upon the happening of the events specified in 
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement.”133  Because the 
LLC articles apparently did not address the right to withdraw and there was 
no written operating agreement,134 the three plaintiffs had not technically 
withdrawn, despite having clearly “left” their old firm and started a new 
one.135  Thus, they still had standing to bring a derivative action.136  The 
 
 127. Crouse, 658 S.E.2d 33.  The defendant in Crouse argued that since the plaintiff 
filed a petition with the Secretary of State’s Office to dissolve the LLC prior to filing his 
lawsuit, he was automatically no longer a member pursuant to the North Carolina Limited 
Liability Act, asserting that section 57C-3-02(3)(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes 
controlled.  Id. at 38.  The court of appeals concluded that the defendant had misinterpreted 
the then-applicable statute, and that a member only ceased to be a member under former 
section 57C-3-02(3)(d) if the member itself filed for its own dissolution.  Id. at 39–40.  
Nothing in the 2013 act would seem to change this outcome.  Further, there may be some 
question under the 2013 act whether an entity that is a member of an LLC will cease to be a 
member by starting dissolution proceedings. 
 128. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705 
S.E.2d 757 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 129. Id. at 760. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 768 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-5-06 (repealed 2013)). 
 134. Id.  The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that certain documents and 
behavior should have been construed collectively as an operating agreement.  Id.  The trial 
court had accepted the argument that the plaintiffs were estopped from denying that they 
had withdrawn, but the court of appeals rejected application of equitable principles.  Id. at 
770–71. 
 135. Id. at 772. 
 136. Id. at 771–72.  One reason that the plaintiff should be a member at the time she 
brings suit is that only one with an ongoing proprietary interest in the entity will adequately 
represent the entity’s interest—remembering that the entity is deemed the real party in 
interest, entitled to any recovery.  Schupack v. Covelli, 498 F. Supp. 704, 705 (W.D. Pa. 
1980).  The Brewer result is inconsistent with this principle, because the Brewer plaintiffs 
29
Burkhard: Resolving LLC Member Disputes in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
254 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:225 
court also allowed both sides’ claims that the other had breached fiduciary 
duties to proceed, some directly and some derivatively.137 
The result in Brewer might be very different under the new LLC act.  
New section 57D-3-02(a)(4) provides that a person ceases to be a member 
when the person abandons all of the rights of his ownership interest except 
for his economic interest.138 
If a plaintiff is deemed to no longer be a member when she leaves her 
law firm and sets up a new firm, under the new statute, she will be unable 
to pursue even a derivative action, since only a “member” may bring a 
derivative action.139  Further, if the defendant’s asserted wrongful “act or 
omission” technically occurred after the plaintiff “abandoned” her interest, 
the plaintiff will not have standing.140 
It seems highly likely that when lawyers practicing together in LLCs 
have a falling out, as described in Crouse and Brewer,141 that one or more 
will simply walk out the door and immediately set up a new practice 
without considering the possible ramifications that this may have on any 
rights they might have to sue their former “partners.”  It should be noted 
that it is much more likely that if a member engages in the types of 
activities that these plaintiffs carried on, such as walking out of meetings, 
stating that they were quitting, forming a new firm, and writing letters 
stating that they were withdrawing, the court will have no trouble finding 
 
merely wanted their money from the LLC and had no interest in continuing with their old 
firm.  Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 769. 
 137. Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 773–74. 
 138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-02(a)(4) (amended 2014).  This provision can apparently 
be modified in the operating agreement per section 57D-2-30(b), and counsel should 
consider with the clients whether it should be modified when drafting the operating 
agreement.  A person’s ownership interest is defined as: 
All of an interest owner’s rights and obligations as an interest owner in an LLC, 
including (i) any economic interest, (ii) any right to participate in the management 
or approve actions proposed by persons responsible for the management of the 
LLC, (iii) any right to bring a derivative action, and (iv) any right to inspect the 
books and records of or receive information from the LLC. 
Id. § 57D-1-03(25).  An “interest owner” is “[a] member or an economic interest owner.”  
Id. § 57D-1-03(15). 
 139. Id. § 57D-8-01(a). 
 140. Id. § 57D-8-01(a)(1)(i).  For example, as in the Brewer case, is the failure to pay the 
plaintiff her share of LLC funds determined when the remaining members make initial 
statements of refusal to pay, or is it at some later point after the plaintiff has abandoned the 
firm and the defendants then definitely refuse to pay?  If the operative event is deemed to 
occur after she abandons, she has no right to pursue a derivative claim.  See Brewer, 705 
S.E.2d at 771–72. 
 141. See Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 760; Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33, 35 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2008). 
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that the member has “abandoned,” either because the operating agreement 
will state that such behavior constitutes withdrawal, or the court will 
conclude that her actions constitute an abandonment under the statute.142  
One can anticipate that in many, if not most, instances, the court will find 
that their behavior is a withdrawal or dissociation, thus preventing them 
from suing.  There is no right to a direct suit because there are no duties 
owed to them, and no right to a derivative suit because they are no longer 
members.  If this happens with law firms, as Crouse and Brewer 
demonstrate, it will certainly occur in a non-law-firm setting, wherein the 
“dissociating” members will surely have “no clue” that their behavior in 
leaving has cut off any rights they may have had as former members.143  In 
North Carolina and in many other states, the withdrawn member will no 
longer have a right to bring even a derivative suit to try and rectify any 
wrongful behavior that triggered her leaving.144 
If the LLC is no longer in existence, a derivative suit will almost never 
be permitted.145  Note that the fact that the LLC has dissolved does not 
 
 142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-02(a)(4). 
 143. In fact, this situation has already arisen outside of the law-firm context.  See, e.g., 
Hosp. Consultants, LLC v. Angeron, 41 So. 3d 1236, 1241 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 
an individual who would automatically become a member of the LLC if the controlling 
party had not allegedly improperly failed to pay debenture owed by the LLC (and instead 
misappropriated the needed funds), was not a member and thus had no standing to bring a 
derivative suit claiming misuse of funds); Gowin v. Granite Depot, LLC, 634 S.E.2d 714, 
717–18, 722 (Va. 2006) (reversing the trial court’s determination that an 80% member had 
amended the articles of organization and then properly used the amended articles as a 
method to terminate the 20% member, and as such, the former 20% member had no 
standing to bring a derivative suit complaining about his removal); see also James R. 
Burkhard, Resolving LLC Member Disputes in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin, and the Other States That Enacted the Prototype LLC Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 405, 
422–23 (2012) (asserting that a Massachusetts opinion wrongly concluded that a member no 
longer had standing to bring a derivative suit because the LLC was dissolved). 
 144. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:3, at 651 n.15 (listing cases where 
standing by a former member was contested); cf. Cameron v. Rohn, No. 10-126, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18986, at *9–13 (D.V.I. Feb. 14, 2012).  In a law firm break-up that occurred 
in the Virgin Islands, the defendant argued that the plaintiff, who had clearly withdrawn 
from the LLC, lacked standing to bring direct claims.  Id.  Although the court concluded, 
based on its interpretation of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, that the plaintiff, 
as a withdrawn member, still could pursue her direct claims, id. at *12–13, it undoubtedly 
could have concluded that she would have been barred from bringing a derivative claim. 
 145. See, e.g., Price v. Upper Chesapeake Health Ventures, 995 A.2d 1054, 1062 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“[A]n LLC whose rights have been forfeited for tax failures still 
exists as an entity, but may only defend an action in court, not prosecute one.”).  However, 
if the LLC managers deliberately failed to file tax returns in order to defeat the plaintiffs’ 
standing, it would be inequitable to prohibit the plaintiff from pursuing a derivative suit.  Id. 
at 1066–68. 
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mean that it is no longer in existence.146  In fact, the statute provides that 
“[t]he dissolution of the LLC does not prevent commencement of a 
proceeding by or against the LLC in its own name.”147 
Another problem that is not cured by the new LLC act is that if a 
member who would have standing to bring a derivative suit dies and her 
membership interest is left by will to her husband or child, that person will 
not have standing to bring the action.  The statute provides that if a 
membership “devolves” on a person, he will have standing to bring the 
action.148  However, unless specifically provided for in the operating 
agreement or agreed to by the members,149 the beneficiary will not be a 
“member,” but a mere “economic interest” owner.150  Thus, the beneficiary 
will not be entitled to bring the derivative suit.  A number of states have 
cured this problem and permit the beneficiary, standing in the shoes of the 
decedent, to bring the action.151 
4.  A plus for the plaintiffs, the new statute may make it much more 
difficult for the defendants to have the suit dismissed 
In the typical derivative squabble, the defendants may attempt to have 
the action dismissed, likely by a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
maintenance of the proceeding is not in the best interests of the LLC.  
Adopting the corporate procedures, such a motion must be made by an 
independent body, and if it is not, the motion must be dismissed.152  In the 
context of LLC disputes, it seems likely, as described below, that it will be 
difficult to assemble an independent body, and one wonders whether the 
defendants will have the forethought to utilize the option of a court-
appointed independent panel.153 
 
 146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-07 (stating that the dissolved LLC goes into “wind up” 
mode). 
 147. Id. § 57D-6-07(f). 
 148. Id. § 57D-8-01(a)(1). 
 149. Id. § 57D-5-04. 
 150. Id. §§ 57D-3-01(b), -5-02. 
 151. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1001 (2013) (stating that an assignee is 
entitled to bring a derivative action). 
 152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(b); see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 introductory 
cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013) (noting that a motion to dismiss must be made by 
eligible decision makers); see also Blake v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., No. 03-0003, 2006 
Mass. Super. LEXIS 241, at *36 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 2006) (“A motion to dismiss 
premised upon the determination of an improperly constituted [Special Litigation 
Committee] is statutorily insufficient.”).  
 153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(f). 
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The Brewer case is a typical example.154  In Brewer, there were seven 
lawyers in the LLC.155  Three lawyers complained that the other four had 
acted improperly to deny them LLC profits to which they were entitled.156  
Apparently, all four of the remaining members were in agreement not to 
pay the plaintiffs.157  Although the statute states that merely naming the 
four as defendants does not automatically disqualify them,158 as to the 
defendants who actually made the decision not to pay, it would be hard for 
a court to conclude that they are “independent.”159  They would personally 
gain by not paying the profits that the plaintiffs claimed that they were 
properly entitled to, and as such, they could hardly be deemed disinterested 
or independent. 
In LeCann v. Cobham,160 the plaintiff and defendant were each 50% 
shareholders.161  The plaintiff established that the defendant had wrongfully 
withdrawn hundreds of thousands of dollars from their four equally owned 
corporations.162  The defendant herself obviously would be conflicted and 
could not be an “independent” party entitled to move to dismiss the 
complaint, and would not even have the requisite voting power to ask the 
court to appoint a disinterested panel.   
In Scott v. Lackey,163 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant managers 
improperly diverted funds from the LLC for their own personal use, and 
improperly covered up the diversion.164  Under the circumstances, it was 
 
 154. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705 
S.E.2d 757 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 155. Id. at 760. 
 156. Id. at 761. 
 157. Id. 
 158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(c)(2) (providing that “[t]he naming of [a] person as a 
defendant in [a] derivative proceeding or as a person against whom action is demanded,” by 
itself, will not “necessarily preclude [that] person from being considered to be 
independent”). 
 159. This conclusion is supported in part by section 57D-8-03(c)(3) of the North 
Carolina General Statutes, which also provides that a person’s approval of the act 
challenged in the derivative proceeding or demand will not, by itself, preclude that person 
from being considered independent so long as “the act resulted in no personal benefit to the 
person.”  Id. § 57D-8-03(c)(3).  In the Brewer case, the decision not to pay the plaintiffs 
resulted in personal benefits to the defendants.  See Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 761. 
 160. LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Nov. 7, 2012). 
 161. Id. at *1–2. 
 162. Id. at *10. 
 163. Scott v. Lackey, No. 11 CVS 19560, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 60, at *3–4 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 3, 2012). 
 164. Id. at *6–10. 
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essentially impossible for the defendants to plausibly assert their 
independence, thus negating their ability to move to dismiss.165 
Most courts will likely determine that a manager or member is 
independent if she has neither (1) a material interest in the outcome of the 
proceeding (that would not devolve on the LLC or members generally), nor 
(2) a material relationship with a person who has such an interest 
(including a familial, financial, professional, or employment relationship 
that would reasonably be expected to impair the director’s objectivity).166 
The Robinson treatise defines the term “independent” as “both disinterested 
by reason of not having an interest in the challenged act and objective in 
the sense of not being influenced in favor of the defendants by reason of 
personal or other relationships (the so-called ‘structural bias’).”167 
However, both Massachusetts and Wisconsin have adopted a much 
broader seven-factor “totality of the circumstances” test.168  Wisconsin has 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. See, e.g., Sojitz Am. Capital Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 573 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2013) (applying the model act term “qualified,” which presumably means the same (quoting 
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-605(a)(1), (b)(1) (2013))); see also Halebian v. Berv, 869 F. Supp. 
2d 420, 444–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  The Halebian court stated: 
[W]hile § 7.44 [of the parallel Massachusetts Business Corporation Act] does not 
define “independent,” the comments to the section do illuminate the intent of its 
drafters as to the term’s meaning. . . . In the first of these comments, the drafters 
observed that “[o]ther jurisdictions examin[ing] the qualifications of directors 
making the determination have required that they be both “disinterested” . . . and 
“independent.”  The drafters explicate “disinterested” in this sense to mean “not 
having a personal interest in the transaction being challenged as opposed to a 
benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all shareholders generally” and 
“independent” to mean “not being influenced in favor of the defendants by reason 
of personal or other relationships.” 
Id. (citations omitted); see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013) 
(defining “qualified director”). 
 167. ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[3], at 17-33 (7th ed. 2014). 
 168. Blake v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., No. 03-0003, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 241, at 
*46–47 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 2006).  The court stated: 
The totality of the circumstances test considers the following nonexclusive list of 
factors: (1) an SLC member’s status as a defendant and whether this potential 
liability is small or substantial, direct or indirect; (2) whether the SLC member’s 
participation in or approval of the alleged wrongdoing was substantial or the result 
of innocent or pro forma involvement or affiliations; (3) an SLC member’s past or 
present business dealings with the corporation; (4) an SLC member’s past or 
present business or social dealings with individual defendants; (5) the number of 
directors on the SLC, such that with the greater number of directors, less weight 
may be accorded to any disabling interest affecting only one director; and (6) the 
structural bias of the SLC, such as whether the manner in which the SLC was 
appointed and proceeded was inevitably bound to be empathetic to the defendants 
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admonished that this test should be applied with “care and rigor”169 and that 
the trial court must “examine carefully whether members of a special 
litigation committee are independent.”170 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
noted that its test, along with the provisions of the model act adopted in 
Wisconsin (and now also in North Carolina), are designed to overcome the 
effects of any structural bias inherent in having members of the board pass 
judgment on their peers.171 
The three model act factors (adopted in North Carolina) that do not 
automatically preclude a person from being independent have been held to 
“not support the conclusion that the Legislature intended to set a low 
threshold for the standard of independence.”172 
North Carolina court opinions determining whether directors of a 
Delaware corporation or LLC doing business in North Carolina are 
sufficiently independent to “excuse demand” may also be helpful in 
determining when a manager is deemed independent.173  Similar “demand 
excused” cases in other jurisdictions suggest that it may be quite common 
for the court to easily find that the defendants in LLC disputes are not 
“independent.”174  For example, demand has been excused, essentially 
acknowledging that the defendants are not independent, when the 
managing party had an interest in both sides of a transaction, each director 
received individual annual consulting fees being questioned, or when a 
 
and therefore biased in favor of terminating the litigation.  Some courts add as a 
seventh factor the roles of corporate counsel and independent counsel, such that 
an SLC is more likely to be found independent if it retains counsel who has not 
represented individual defendants or the corporation in the past. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 89–90 (Wis. 2000).  See 
generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Propriety of Termination of Properly Initiated 
Derivative Action by “Independent Committee” Appointed by Board of Directors Whose 
Actions (Or Inaction) Are Under Attack, 22 A.L.R.4th 1206 (1983). 
 169. Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 91. 
 170. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. at 90. 
 172. Blake, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 241, at *41–42 (citing Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 
86–87); Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 81 (“[T]he circuit court and the court of appeals erred in 
declaring that the threshold established by the legislature in § 180.0744 in determining 
whether a member of a special litigation committee is independent is ‘extremely low.’”). 
 173. See, e.g., In re Pozen S’holders Litig., Nos. 04 CVS 1540, 04 CVS 1542, 2005 
NCBC LEXIS 7, at *16–43 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005); Marcoux v. Prim, No. 04 CVS 
920, 2004 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *43–47 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2004) (discussing tests to 
determine if directors were independent in approving a proposed merger). 
 174. See, e.g., Sacher v. Beacon Assocs. Mgmt. Corp., No. 005424/09, 2010 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 992, at *22–23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2010) (excusing demand against the manager 
of an LLC who had self-interest in not being sued for breach of duty); see also RIBSTEIN & 
KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:3, at 653 n.20. 
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controlling member used the business’s assets to divert value to himself 
and away from the controlled business and its minority owners.175 
When a derivative claim is brought against the managers or 
controlling members, it is certainly possible that the defendants, 
anticipating that a court might not accept their motion to dismiss, might ask 
the court to appoint a panel composed of one or more independent persons 
to determine whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the 
best interest of the LLC, in hopes that the panel will determine that the 
lawsuit should not continue.176  If the panel moves to dismiss, apparently 
the court must grant the motion unless the panel failed to conduct an 
appropriate inquiry, with the burden placed on the plaintiff to demonstrate 
the inadequacy.177  How often will the defendants resort to this procedure in 
the context of a five- or ten-person LLC with squabbles as to whether one 
or more members engaged in inappropriate behavior?  One would assume 
that this will not be a commonly used procedure.  Will counsel even 
consider this as a possibility? 
However, for the plaintiff to effectively challenge the defendant’s 
“independence,” the plaintiff often will likely have to assert essentially the 
same facts that would prove the merits of her case.178 
In considering these various steps, one wonders whether there is that 
much difference between North Carolina’s requirement that a demand must 
always be made, and those states which permit the plaintiff to assert that 
demand is not required.  Will the arguments as to whether the case should 
proceed be at all different in the two types of jurisdictions? 
 
 175. See DEMOTT, supra note 86, § 5:13, at 703–53 (listing numerous examples of the 
criteria for excuse regarding demand on directors); see also RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra 
note 4, § 10:3, at 654 n.22 (listing LLC decisions where demand has and has not been 
excused in LLC litigation, noting factors that likely will be similarly applied to determine if 
LLC managers or those moving to dismiss are independent); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1831, at 123–26 (3d ed. 2007).  Wright explains 
that a plaintiff should not be forced to “undertake a purely ritualistic act,” such as when “the 
basis of [the] plaintiff’s complaint is mismanagement or fraud on the part of a majority of 
the directors themselves.”  Id. at 123.  “Thus, a demand may be excused when plaintiff 
alleges, with supporting facts, that the individual directors are the alleged wrongdoers or are 
under the control of the real defendants.”  Id. at 123–24 (footnote omitted). 
 176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(f) (amended 2014). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Cf. DEMOTT, supra note 86, § 5:13, at 744–45 (noting that the Delaware approach 
“requires the court to resolve dispositive substantive questions about the merits of the 
litigation in the context of determining whether the demand ‘prerequisites’ for suit have 
been met” before the “[f]actual issues have . . . been developed . . . through trial,” and that 
the plaintiff at that point is not “entitled to take discovery to supplement his allegation that 
making a demand would be futile”). 
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5.  The plaintiff may have difficulty pleading “particularized facts” 
The North Carolina statutory requirement that a petitioning member 
must plead “particularized facts” is a requirement that has caused plaintiffs 
substantial headaches in regard to other derivative issues.179  Even if the 
evidence admitted by the court demonstrates that a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss should be denied, if the plaintiff’s pleadings do not meet the 
requisite factual particularity-pleading requirement, the court can grant the 
motion to dismiss.180 
The Wright and Miller treatise explains that in the analogous pleading 
of “demand futility,” which also requires “particularized factual pleading,” 
“it is a good practice to provide as detailed an explanation in the complaint 
concerning the lack of a demand as is possible.”181  As the Supreme Court 
of Delaware stated, “[a] prolix complaint larded with conclusory 
language . . . does not comply with these fundamental pleading 
mandates.”182  Apparently, the plaintiff is not required to plead 
“evidence.”183  The Wright and Miller treatise lists numerous cases in 
which the plaintiff has attempted to adequately plead facts necessary to 
justify a finding that demand should be excused.  Not surprisingly, in a 
significant number of the cited cases, the plaintiff failed to adequately 
plead sufficient facts.184  This frequent failure suggests that it may be 
equally difficult for a North Carolina plaintiff to challenge, on the 
pleadings, either the independence of the alleged wrongdoing managers or 
members or the sufficiency of their inquiry.185 
 
 179. See generally Alan J. Jacobs, Derivative Actions by Shareholders, in 10 FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION §§ 25:111 to :144, at 270–98 (Francis M. Dougherty & Julie 
R. Cataldo eds., 2007) (discussing the similar requirements for pleading particularized facts 
that will demonstrate that demand is not required as a prerequisite to a derivative suit).  But 
cf. McKee v. James, No. 09 CVS 3031, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *24–25 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
July 24, 2013) (noting that the plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity the information 
that was withheld). 
 180. See Sojitz Am. Capital Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 576 n.16 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2013). 
 181. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 1831, at 118. 
 182. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). 
 183. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 351 (Del. Ch. 
2012) (noting that the requirement of pleading particular facts does not require the plaintiff 
to plead evidence (quoting Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 
845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004))), rev’d on other grounds, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013). 
 184. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 1831, at 114 n.24, 131 n.42. 
 185. On the other hand, in Scott v. Lackey, a 2012 business court case, the plaintiff had 
little difficulty in adequately pleading numerous causes of action against his co-managers. 
See Scott v. Lackey, No. 11 CVS 19560, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 60, at *61 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 3, 2012). 
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A Missouri opinion suggests that the critical determination as to 
whether one has sufficiently pleaded particularized facts is simply whether 
the defendant knows what the action involves.186 
6.  It is likely unclear how a court will determine if a proper 
evaluation has been made by those seeking to dismiss 
Courts may be very critical of the evaluation.  In the analogous 
context, when courts have been asked to review the work of a special 
litigation committee, they sometimes have been very critical,187 especially 
where the committee has failed to cite to specific sources to verify its 
assertions.188  The Tennessee Court of Appeals suggested that the court 
should examine “(1) the length and scope of the investigation, (2) the 
committee’s use of independent counsel or experts, (3) the corporation’s or 
the defendants’ involvement, if any, in the investigation, and (4) the 
adequacy and reliability of the information supplied to the committee.”189 
However, the plaintiff’s burden “is not just to show that the [special 
litigation committee’s (SLC)] inquiry and report were flawed, or that 
someone else might have reached a different conclusion, but that the SLC’s 
‘inquiry and . . . conclusions [do not] follow logically.’”190 As the United 
States District Court for the District of Connecticut explained, “[t]he 
shareholder demand process does not require an SLC to do litigation-type 
discovery before arriving at its conclusions.”191  The defendants’ failure to 
interview possible critical witnesses and obtain an independent financial 
analysis may not be grounds to reject their report.192  The fact that the 
defendant committee had infrequent and brief meetings, the investigation 
lasted only one month, counsel reviewed documents on their own, and 
limited fees were spent for the investigation may not be a basis for 
 
 186. New England Carpenters Pension Fund v. Haffner, 391 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2012) (quoting Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1985)). 
 187. Blake v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., No. 03-0003, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 241, at 
*79 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 2006) (“[T]he SLC’s investigation was so lacking in 
substance, scope and support as to raise serious questions about the good faith and 
reasonableness of the SLC’s inquiry.”). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 190. Frank v. LoVetere, 363 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 7.44 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013)); see also Sojitz Am. Capital 
Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 580 (Conn. Ct. App. 2013) (“Accordingly, the court may 
conduct a limited review into the board’s conclusions to determine that they follow logically 
from the inquiry, but may not scrutinize the reasonableness of its determination.”). 
 191. See Frank, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 338. 
 192. Id. at 335–38. 
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challenging the report.193  However, in another action, a former general 
counsel and his firm spent one thousand hours gathering relevant facts, 
including collecting and reviewing over twenty thousand pages of 
documents, in advising a special litigation committee.194 
In an older corporate derivative suit, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court noted that, in evaluating the procedures of a special litigation 
committee, the plaintiffs must be permitted to develop and present evidence 
that (1) the committee may have been unqualified to assess the “intricate 
and allegedly false tax and accounting information supplied to it by those 
within the corporate structure who would benefit from decisions not to 
proceed with litigation,” (2) that the committee received false or 
incomplete information for evaluation, and (3) that, because of those 
problems, “the committee’s decision with respect to the litigation 
eviscerates plaintiffs’ opportunities as minority shareholders to vindicate 
their rights under North Carolina law.”195 
In a comparable situation that dealt with whether the defendants 
properly rejected a demand, the court concluded that it could consider 
allegations of self-interest in determining if the decision was reached in 
good faith and with reasonableness.196  The defendants’ refusal to meet 
with the plaintiff and their assertion that they retained a stake in a claimed 
improper distribution from the LLC drew into question their good faith and 
reasonable investigation into the demand.197 
7.  The role of the court in ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss 
may be confusing 
If the plaintiff files a derivative action and the defendants move to 
dismiss, it may be unclear how the parties should proceed and which 
standards should be applied.  The North Carolina Business Court Rules 
note that if “allegations of facts not appearing of record are relied upon to 
support a motion, affidavits, parts of depositions, and other pertinent 
documents then available shall accompany the motion.”198  In evaluating 
whether to dismiss, the North Carolina court apparently should not treat 
this as a simple Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and not even merely as a motion for 
summary judgment, since the court must make findings of fact regarding 
 
 193. Id. at 335 n.6. 
 194. Halebian v. Berv, 869 F. Supp. 2d 420, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 195. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987). 
 196. Scott v. Lackey, No. 11 CVS 19560, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 60, at *28–29 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2012). 
 197. Id. at *30–31. 
 198. N.C. BUS. CT. R. 15.5. 
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the independence of the moving body and whether proper procedures were 
used.199 
Federal courts attempting to resolve similar derivative claims have 
found this difficult, requiring the court to convert what would normally be 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment (still a “step 
below” the apparent North Carolina procedures).200  Both Connecticut and 
Massachusetts have also adopted section 7.44 of the model act, and like 
North Carolina, have noted that such a motion is not treated simply as a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.201 
Georgia courts have noted that when a defendant moves to dismiss a 
derivative action, the motion “is perhaps best considered as a hybrid 
summary judgment motion for dismissal because the stockholder plaintiff’s 
standing to maintain the suit has been lost.”202  A federal opinion noted that 
the Connecticut statute contemplates “that the court will review the 
plaintiff’s complaint on its face, using a heightened review standard akin to 
that required in fraud cases,” since discovery is only available to the 
plaintiff after she has first successfully stated a cause of action.203  
However, the court will consider the plaintiff’s proffered evidence as to 
whether the determination to dismiss was made independently, in good 
faith, and, after reasonable inquiry, if the parties have agreed to discovery, 
 
 199. See Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445, 457 (N.C. 1990) (applying essentially the 
identical corporate derivative statute and concluding that the trial judge, not the jury, must 
hold an evidentiary hearing); cf. Thompson v. Sci. Atlanta, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 796, 798–99 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the company’s motion was supported by a voluminous and 
detailed report for which the plaintiff failed to come forward with “evidence” challenging 
the lack of independence of those requesting dismissal). 
 200. See Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 201. See Sojitz Am. Capital Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 572 (Conn. Ct. App. 2013).  
The Sojitz court explains: 
Section 33-724 is distinguishable from other motions to dismiss, as it sets forth a 
unique, heightened pleading standard and elements that must be either proven or 
disproven.  In light of these substantive requirements, other jurisdictions have 
similarly concluded that dismissals pursuant to § 7.44 of the model act are 
unique. . . . [T]hese jurisdictions have concluded that trial courts, in their 
discretion, may issue discovery orders.  In rendering judgments on these motions 
to dismiss, trial courts and appellate courts have thus reviewed the entire record, 
consisting of the complaint and documents submitted in support of and opposition 
to the motion to dismiss—in some instances the courts have even considered and 
resolved disputed factual issues. 
Id. (citing numerous cases, including Halebian, 644 F.3d at 130–31). 
 202. Thompson, 621 S.E.2d at 799 (quoting Millsap v. Am. Family Corp., 430 S.E.2d 
385, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 203. Frank v. LoVetere, 363 F. Supp. 2d 327, 333 (D. Conn. 2005). 
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but the plaintiff must still show “with particularity” facts supporting his 
allegations.204 
At least two states have determined that an appeal from a trial court’s 
determination to dismiss will be reviewed by an appellate court as a mixed 
question of fact and law, and thus will be subject to plenary review by the 
appellate court.205 
Whatever procedures are followed, it is likely that this will not be a 
simple matter for the court to resolve.  A six-day hearing occurred in the 
Alford litigation,206 and a seven-day trial was required in Wisconsin to 
determine whether members of a litigation committee were independent.207 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AVOIDING THE PITFALLS  
OF DERIVATIVE LITIGATION 
The problems that will likely be created by the default rules in the new 
LLC act suggest that counsel need to advise their clients on the possibility 
of drafting around these problems or pursuing a different type of remedy. 
A. Alternative: Include an Arbitration Clause or Pursue Mediation 
1.  Arbitration 
One obvious possibility is that the operating agreement could contain 
a clause that requires all disputes among members and managers to be 
resolved through arbitration.  Bishop and Kleinberger point out in their 
treatise that such provisions should be enforceable, but they raise some 
question as to whether the operating agreement could displace or place 
barriers on the use of derivative suits.208  The North Carolina statute says 
that you can,209 but Bishop and Kleinberger question whether private 
agreements can restrain a court’s power to do equity.210  O’Neal and 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Sojitz, 61 A.3d at 572–73. 
 206. Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445, 458 (N.C. 1990). 
 207. See Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 83 (Wis. 2000). 
 208. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, § 10.07[3], at S10-54 to -55 (Cum. 
Supp. No. 1 2009); see also RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:3, at 663 (“There is 
significant authority enforcing arbitration as an alternative to derivative suits in LLCs.  
However, the courts may interpret the arbitration clause so as to limit its application.  In 
general, there is a growing body of law interpreting arbitration clauses in LLC operating 
agreements.”). 
 209. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-30(b)(5) (amended 2014). 
 210. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, § 10.07[3], at S10-54 to -55 (Cum. Supp. 
No. 1 2009). 
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Thompson point out that attempts to arbitrate matters of dissolution have 
been prohibited.211 
As a word of caution, arbitration can be a lengthy process.  A recent 
two-member LLC arbitration took eight years to be resolved.212  Maybe we 
should all heed the comments of Judge Joseph F. Anderson, a well-
respected federal judge, that today’s courts can provide a much quicker 
forum than arbitration.213 
2.  Mediation 
North Carolina LLC disputes will almost always be resolved in the 
North Carolina Business Court.214  “As such, all cases . . . shall be subject 
to the Rules Implementing Statewide Mediated Settlement Conferences in 
Superior Court Civil Actions and such other rules or orders consistent 
therewith as may be established or entered by the Business Court.”215  
Although the court does not keep statistics regarding how many actions are 
resolved through mediation, former Chief Judge Jolly of the North Carolina 
Business Carolina has advised that even when the mediation process does 
not resolve the matter, the process often provides both sides with important 
information leading to a settlement.216 
 
 211. See 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 9:46, at 9-303 (rev. 3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter O’NEAL & 
THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS]. 
 212. Kriti Ripley, LLC v. Emerald Invs., LLC, 746 S.E.2d 26, 27–29 (S.C. 2013) 
(describing a series of arbitrations and suits starting in 2005 and lasting through the South 
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in 2013). 
 213. Cox v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., Nos. 3:12-cv-03333-JFA, 4:12-cv-03407-JFA, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140602, at *3 n.1 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2013). 
 214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4(a)(1). 
 215. N.C. BUS. CT. R. 19.1.  To implement the mediation, Business Court Rule 17.1(h) 
requires the parties in the case-management meeting to cover “[t]he timing of any mediated 
settlement conference . . . and the selection of a mediator or group of mediators.”  Id. R. 
17.1(h).  In implementing this, the case-management order (Business Court Form 2) 
specifically requires the parties to file the name of the mediator that they have selected and 
to designate that mediation shall be completed by a specified date.  See Form 2, at 50, 
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/Hyperlinked%20Rules(1).pdf (last visited May 
2, 2015). 
 216. Telephone Interview with Hon. John R. Jolly, Jr., former Chief Special Superior 
Court Judge for Complex Business Cases, N.C. Business Court (Oct. 3, 2013).  Former 
Chief Judge Jolly also pointed out that most litigation is usually settled and does not go to 
trial.  Id. 
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B. Provide for Dispute Resolution in the LLC Buy–Sell Agreement 
Every well-drafted LLC operating agreement should include some sort 
of buy–sell agreement.217  It may be possible to draft an equitable buy–sell 
agreement that would be triggered by a dispute among the members. 
C. Bring an Action for Oppression 
An alternative that may be particularly attractive in North Carolina for 
an unhappy LLC member is to bring an action for oppression under section 
57D-6-02 of the North Carolina General Statutes.218  The North Carolina 
cases where this claim has been raised in the context of a close corporation 
are particularly favorable to an unhappy member, including the widely 
noted Meiselman219 opinion, which established a four-step requirement for 
relief when the plaintiff asserts that the wrongful actions have frustrated her 
reasonable expectations.220  Counsel for the plaintiff should particularly 
 
 217. O’Neal and Thompson outline the basic considerations of buy–sell agreements.  See 
O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 9, § 6:16, at 6-32. 
 218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02 (“The superior court may dissolve an LLC in a 
proceeding brought by . . . [a] member, if it is established that (i) it is not practicable to 
conduct the LLC’s business in conformance with the operating agreement and [Chapter 57] 
or (ii) liquidation of the LLC is necessary to protect the rights and interests of the 
member.”); see also Battles v. Bywater, LLC, No. 14 CVS 1853, 2014 NCBC LEXIS 54, at 
*24–25 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2014) (appointing a receiver and noting that “deadlock” is 
still a ground for dissolution); Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock N.C., LLC, No. 07 
CVS 20852, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 32, at *23–24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009) (noting that 
the plaintiff under the former law effectively pleaded facts that suggested dissolution was 
reasonably necessary to protect the minority’s rights and that assets of the LLC were 
misapplied or wasted); Reid Pointe, LLC v. Stevens, No. 08 CVS 4304, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 
16, at *18–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2008) (reluctantly concluding that a member 
adequately alleged facts suggesting that liquidation of the LLC was necessary to protect a 
member’s rights).  Contra Bolier & Co. v. Decca Furniture (USA) Inc., No. 5:12-cv-00160-
RLV-DSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26791, at *12 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2013) (finding a 
minority member initially unsuccessful in asserting oppression claims); High Point Bank & 
Tr. Co. v. Sapona Mfg. Co., 713 S.E.2d 12, 17–18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (finding a 
shareholder unable to demonstrate that it had a substantial reasonable expectation). 
 219. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983). 
 220. Id. at 564 (“For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expectations analysis, he must 
prove that (1) he had one or more substantial reasonable expectations known or assumed by 
the other participants; (2) the expectation has been frustrated; (3) the frustration was without 
fault of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his control; and (4) under all of the 
circumstances of the case plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief.”); see also 
Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 519–21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(illustrating how the four requirements are applied and affirming decision to order 
dissolution of a closely held corporation); Foster v. Foster Farms, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 843, 
849–50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (applying the analogous prior statute, the trial court failed to 
make the findings required by Meiselman). 
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note that by statute, an “oppression” claim is automatically a direct cause of 
action, which avoids the numerous traps in any derivative suit.221  Further, 
pursuant to the new LLC statute, all members have a nonwaivable statutory 
right to bring an action to protect their “rights and interests.”222  It will also 
be unlikely that the operating agreement will have waived the other basis 
for bringing such a suit—that “it is not practicable to conduct the LLC’s 
business in conformance with the operating agreement and [Chapter 57-
D].”223 
It should be noted that because of amendments to the North Carolina 
General Statutes, North Carolina courts no longer have the broad, equitable 
powers to fashion remedies other than liquidation that they had when 
Meiselman was decided.224  One wonders if courts will be less inclined to 
determine that an LLC member has been oppressed, knowing that they 
cannot simply order that the member’s interest be purchased or that the 
member be provided a stream of income or some other less dramatic 
remedy other than dissolution of the business.  However, in one dissolution 
action involving a closely held corporation, even though the court 
concluded that all of the shareholders would be injured if the company was 
liquidated, the court still ordered liquidation after carefully considering 
what value the plaintiffs were entitled to, since the defendant, pursuant to 
the corporate statute, had the statutory option to buy out the complaining 
minority shareholders at the court-approved value.225  This statutory option 
is available to LLCs.226  Counsel must be careful in precisely pleading the 
 
 221. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2) (stating that an action to dissolve is brought by a 
member); see Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *23 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 8, 2013) (“As the court explained during oral argument, it believes that the 
Meiselman claim is an individual claim separate and apart from the breach of fiduciary duty 
claims brought derivatively by Drymax [a limited-liability company], even though they arise 
from a similar evidentiary record.”).  See generally Miller v. Ruth’s of N.C., Inc., 313 
S.E.2d 849 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Kleinberger, supra note 84, at 120 (“Will Claims 
Asserting Oppression Provide an End-Run Around the Direct/Derivative Distinction?”). 
 222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2)(ii); see also id. § 57D-2-30(b)(7) (stating that an 
operating agreement may not supplant, vary, disclaim, or nullify clause (ii) of section 
57D-6-02(2)). 
 223. Id. § 57D-6-02(2)(i). 
 224. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Sapona Mfg. Co., No. 08 CVS 1065, 2010 NCBC 
LEXIS 14, at *16–18 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 22, 2010) (“Former section 55-125.1 gave the 
trial court the power to order alternative forms of relief. . . . After Meiselman, the 
Legislature eliminated the alternative remedies to dissolution set forth in section 55-125.1.  
Courts do not enjoy such broad powers under the current statute.”), aff’d, 713 S.E.2d 12 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2011); see also Blythe, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *23. 
 225. Garlock v. Se. Gas & Power, Inc., No. 00-CVS-01018, 2001 NCBC LEXIS 9, at 
*45–50 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2001). 
 226. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-03(d). 
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member’s right to relief.227 
O’Neal and Thompson’s treatises provide extensive guidance for 
pursuing an oppression action.228  The authors note that the most common 
claim is that it is not reasonably practical to carry on the LLC’s business.229  
However, in cases like Brewer and Crouse, an oppression claim could be 
equally utilized.230 
D. Bring a Direct Claim for Declaratory Judgment 
In Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock North Carolina, LLC,231 
the plaintiff member successfully pleaded a cause of action seeking a 
declaratory judgment as to the value of its membership interest and the 
interpretation of the LLC operating agreement.232  Presumably, clever 
plaintiffs’ attorneys could use this technique even more expansively.  In 
this action, the plaintiff also made a motion for the appointment of a 
receiver.233  Although the court denied the request, the court provides 
guidance as to when this might be appropriate.234 
E. Provide for an Accounting Remedy 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, 
noted that under the former LLC act, unless modified by the operating 
agreement, members of a North Carolina LLC had a statutory duty to 
account for certain improper profits.235  The court of appeals specifically 
implied that this statutory duty ran to both the LLC and to its members.236  
In Brewer, the court of appeals, in granting the dissolution and winding up 
 
 227. Brady v. Van Vlaanderen, No. 12 CVS 7552, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 34, at *10–11 
(N.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013) (granting the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to 
provide more specificity). 
 228. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 211, 
§§ 9:30 to :52, at 9-188 to -329; see also O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 9, 
§§ 6:23 to :27, at 6-50 to -66. 
 229. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 211, 
§ 9:51, at 9-323 (discussing LLC cases applying this principle); O’NEAL & THOMPSON, 
OPPRESSION, supra note 9, § 6:24, at 6-57 to -61 (same). 
 230. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 231. Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock N.C., LLC, No. 07 CVS 20852, 2009 
NCBC LEXIS 32 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009). 
 232. Id. at *15–17. 
 233. Id. at *29. 
 234. Id. at *30–34. 
 235. RSN Props., Inc. v. Jones, No. COA04-100, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 457, at *8–10 
(N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2005) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(e) (repealed 2013)). 
 236. Id. at *8–9. 
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of the LLC, directed the business court to address both the plaintiffs’ 
individual and derivative claims for an accounting.237  The business court 
then appointed a special master to conduct an accounting.238  Another LLC 
member was successful in pleading a claim that she was entitled access to 
all LLC records and to “an accurate accounting of revenues, income, debts, 
obligations, liabilities, distributions and assets.”239  Further, it seems that 
often in disputes among LLC members as to the handling of the funds, an 
accountant will need to sort out the LLC’s finances.240 
Although former section 57C-3-22(e),241 which required managers to 
“account” for any improper benefit or profit, has been dropped from the 
new LLC act, this is an essential agency principle that continues to govern 
LLCs pursuant to new section 57D-2-30(c).242  The new LLC act thus 
essentially incorporates sections 8.11 and 8.12 of the Restatement (Third) 
of Agency, both of which require an agent to account to her principal 
(presumably only the LLC and not the other members), but both of these 
duties may be modified.243 
If one acknowledges that many LLCs actually function as 
partnerships, then it may be appropriate to include in LLC operating 
agreements a provision that grants the members the right to bring an 
 
 237. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705 
S.E.2d 757, 773 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 238. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, No. 
06 CVS 6091, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *25–26 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2013). 
 239. Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock N.C., LLC, No. 07 CVS 20852, 2009 
NCBC LEXIS 32, at *18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009); see also Brady v. Van 
Vlaanderen, No. 12 CVS 7552, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 34, at *8–9 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 
2013) (finding that a member successfully pleaded her right to inspect and copy LLC 
records and that defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion was insufficient to challenge the breadth of 
that inspection). 
 240. See LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *7 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012).  In LeCann, the court appointed a CPA to determine the amount of 
funds that were wrongfully transferred from four closely held entities.  Id.  Even though the 
accountant was unable to complete the task since the transfers were so numerous and 
improperly documented, the partial information was sufficient for the court to conclude that 
the defendant had wrongfully diverted nearly $600,000.  Id. at *7–10. 
 241. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(e) (repealed 2013) (“Except as otherwise provided in 
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement, every manager must account to 
the limited liability company and hold as trustee for it any profit or benefit derived without 
the informed consent of the members by the manager from any transaction connected with 
the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the limited liability company or from any personal 
use by the manager of its property.”). 
 242. Id. § 57D-2-30(c) (amended 2014). 
 243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 8.11–.12 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
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accounting action in appropriate circumstances.244  This Article leaves for 
another day how such a provision should be drafted.245  This is left to the 
creativity of counsel. 
F. Action for Breach of Contract? 
The revised North Carolina LLC act is completely based on the notion 
that an LLC is a creature of contract.246  The revised act specifically 
provides that both the law of agency and the law of contracts govern the 
administration and enforcement of the LLC operating agreement.247  Even 
though the prior statute did not include a provision that the law of contracts 
was to be applied in the enforcement of operating agreements,248 at least 
one opinion, Crouse v. Mineo,249 granted a member the right to directly sue 
his co-member on a quantum meruit claim.250  In another case, a member’s 
individual claim, asserting that the managers breached their contractual 
 
 244. See, e.g., Six Corners Same Day Surgery, LLC v. Macchione, No. 11 CH 18215, 
2013 WL 2145005, at *11–12 (Cook County, Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013) (recognizing an 
accounting as a way to resolve aspects of disputes between LLC members).  Contra 
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:4, at 664–65 (arguing that accounting actions 
have no place in resolving LLC disputes). 
 245. See JAMES R. BURKHARD, PARTNERSHIP AND LLC LITIGATION MANUAL: ACTIONS 
FOR ACCOUNTING AND OTHER REMEDIES §§ 7.01–.05, at 145–84 (1995). 
 246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-10-01.  Section 57D-10-01 states that the purpose of the 
chapter “is to provide a flexible framework under which one or more persons may organize 
or manage one or more business as they determine to be appropriate with minimum, 
prescribed formalities or constraints.”  Id. § 57D-10-01(b).  The policy of the chapter is “to 
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and the enforceability of 
operating agreements.”  Id. § 57D-10-01(c); see also id. § 57D-2-30(a).  Section 57D-2-
30(a) provides: 
The operating agreement governs the internal affairs of an LLC and the rights, 
duties, and obligations of (i) the interest owners, . . . in relation to each other, the 
LLC, and their ownership interests or rights to acquire ownership interests and (ii) 
the company officials in relation to each other, the LLC, and the interest owners.  
Subject to the limitations set forth in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this 
section, the provisions of this Chapter and common law will apply only to the 
extent contrary or inconsistent provisions are not made in, or are not otherwise 
supplanted, varied, disclaimed, or nullified by, the operating agreement.  The 
provisions of the operating agreement are severable and each will apply to the 
extent it is valid and enforceable. 
Id. 
 247. Id. § 57D-2-30(e). 
 248. Id. § 57C-10-03(e) (repealed 2013) (providing that the statute was to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
operating agreements). 
 249. Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 250. Id. at 41–42. 
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obligation to manage the LLC in a prudent and businesslike manner, 
survived, on a limited basis, a motion for summary judgment.251  With the 
new act now specifically stating that the law of contracts governs the 
enforcement of the LLC operating agreement, is it more probable that an 
unhappy member may be able to successfully bring a direct claim, rather 
than a derivative claim, to enforce her contract rights as established in the 
operating agreement?252 
G. Best Solution: Permit Direct Suits if All Members Are Joined 
The leading treatise is exceptionally critical of the use of derivative 
suits to resolve disputes among members and managers of LLCs.253  
Ribstein and Keatinge suggest that if there are disputes among the members 
and managers of the LLC, the better solution is to simply allow a direct suit 
requiring all members to be joined in the action.254  O’Neal and Thompson 
also have identified a growing trend to allow disputes in closely held 
businesses to be brought directly.255  Although there may be no evidence 
confirming the same (and such might be a topic of empirical research), 
when one reads the many reported LLC member-dispute cases, most of the 
cases do not seem to be “strike suits,” and thus have no need for protections 
provided by the derivative procedures.  However, the derivative-demand 
requirement that permits the company to resolve its own problems may 
prevent members from being able to bring mere power-struggle squabbles 
into court, which judges suggest do not belong in court.256 
 
 251. See BOGNC, LLC v. Cornelius NC Self-Storage, LLC, Nos. 10 CVS 19072, 10 
CVS 12371, 11 CVS 21122, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2013); 
cf. Island Beyond, LLC v. Prime Capital Grp., LLC, No. 12 CVS 7351, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 
48, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2013) (showing that a member dropped his claim for 
breach of the operating agreement). 
 252. See, e.g., Schultheis v. Hatteras Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC, No. 14 CVS 469, 2014 
NCBC LEXIS 23, at *8–14 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 9, 2014) (concluding that minority 
members’ derivative and individual claims that a manager breached the operating agreement 
should be dismissed). 
 253. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:3, at 650–51, § 10:4, at 674–75 
(listing four significant policy arguments why derivative suits should not be used to resolve 
member disputes). 
 254. Id. § 10.4, at 677. 
 255. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 9, § 7:8, at 7-73; see also O’NEAL & 
THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 211, § 9:26, at 9-147 (discussing 
reasons why fiduciary-duty claims increasingly can be brought as direct suits in disputes 
among members of a closely held business). 
 256. See, e.g., Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at 
*31 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (“[T]o find that the Court must decide whose business judgment 
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In some jurisdictions, courts have applied section 7.01(d) of the 
American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance to 
allow one or a few members to bring a direct suit to rectify a wrong 
committed against the LLC and its members.257  Courts have been willing 
to allow a direct suit if all the members are joined in the litigation (either as 
defendants or plaintiffs) and if resolution of the suit will not be injurious to 
creditors not made a party to the action.258  Because most LLCs have few 
members, in many states, it is easy to bring an action pursuant to the 
teaching of section 7.01(d) of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance.259  At least one North Carolina judge has considered this 
option, but ultimately found that it should not apply in that particular case 
because it was unclear who the members were, and because there were 
outstanding creditors.260  Another opinion effectively applied this option in 
the context of a closely held corporation.261 
Following the ALI’s lead, the most practical solution may be simply 
to provide in standard operating agreements a clause that provides that 
disputes among members (or members and managers) that cannot be settled 
by mediation or negotiation are to be resolved in a direct suit wherein each 
member or manager is named either as a plaintiff or defendant.  This not 
only simplifies matters, but it may also reduce overall costs in resolving 
 
was more in keeping with the LLC’s best interests . . . would cripple the policy underlying 
the LLC Act promoting freedom of contract.”). 
 257. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:4, at 675–76; see also James R. 
Burkhard, LLC Member and Limited Partner Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims: Direct or 
Derivative Actions?, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 19, 52–60 (2003). 
 258. See, e.g., Moses v. Pennebaker, 719 S.E.2d 521, 529 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) 
(concluding that in a two-member LLC, one member may bring a direct suit for usurpation 
of LLC opportunities); accord Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 615 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2005) (citing Thomas v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 50–51 (Ga. 1983)).  See generally O’NEAL 
& THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 9, § 6:20, at 6-44 to -45 (“One of the most notable 
movements in close corporations law in recent decades has been the increased willingness 
of courts to permit minority shareholders to bring direct claims for breach of fiduciary 
duties.  That trend can also be seen in the LLC setting and for similar reasons.”). 
 259. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:4, at 675–76.  
 260. Nelson v. All. Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11 CVS 3217, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 39, at 
*38 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2013), appeal dismissed, 761 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2014). 
 261. Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 259 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2000); cf. Gaskin v. J.S. Procter Co., 675 S.E.2d 115, 119–21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting 
that the Norman opinion did not create a new special exception as to when a minority 
shareholder or member might be entitled to bring an individual direct action, and also 
considering the 7.01(d) factors, but noting that they were not present in this case). 
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disputes.262 
The Business Law Section of the American Bar Association has 
recently released a Revised Prototype Limited Liability Company Act, 
which provides as a recommended statutory provision that “[a] member 
may maintain a direct action to enforce a right of a limited liability 
company if all members at the time of suit are parties to the action.”263 
This simple provision could easily be adopted in any North Carolina 
operating agreement.  It accomplishes all of the objectives that the ALI has 
underscored as the most important,264 and it certainly seems to be in 
compliance with the new North Carolina LLC act.265 
CLOSING COMMENTS 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that “[s]ince 1955, 
North Carolina has served as a pioneer and ‘shining light’ in the protection 
of minority shareholder rights.”266  As this Article suggests, that may no 
longer be true.  Whether this is a good or bad change probably depends on 
whether the reader is a plaintiff or defense lawyer.  Even from the 
 
 262. Cf. ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[2], at 17-31 (7th ed. 2014) (noting that the 
advantage of permitting the LLC to request a court-appointed independent body with 
authority to determine if a derivative complaint should be pursued is to reduce costs). 
 263. REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 909(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).  The 
Revised Prototype Act also includes two other optional provisions, providing first for a 
direct suit by one member against another.  See id. §§ 909(a)–(b).  Section 909(a) provides:  
[A] member may maintain a direct action against another member or members or 
the limited liability company, or a series thereof, to enforce the member’s rights 
and otherwise protect the member’s interests, including rights and interests under 
the limited liability company agreement or this Act or arising independently of the 
membership relationship. 
Id. § 909(a).  Further, section 909(b) provides:  
A member maintaining a direct action under subsection (a) must plead and prove 
an actual or threatened injury that is not solely the result of an injury suffered or 
threatened to be suffered by the limited liability company, or series thereof. 
Id. § 909(b).  Second, the Revised Prototype Act, acknowledging that plaintiffs might want 
to resolve disputes through a derivative suit, includes sections 901 through 908, specifying 
how an LLC derivative suit should be pursued.  Id. §§ 901–908. 
 264. All members are protected, since all are joined, and can assert whatever position 
they deem appropriate; there will be only one action.  Presumably, the resolution of a suit 
brought pursuant to this provision would bar subsequent actions, and creditors of the LLC 
are protected, since any recovery goes to the LLC, as the real party in interest. 
 265. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-2-30(b)(5), -32(a) (amended 2014). 
 266. Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(quoting Robert Savage McLean, Note, Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Close 
Corporation Under the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 68 N.C. L. REV. 
1109, 1125–26 (1990)). 
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plaintiff’s perspective, though, it is certainly not all “gloom and doom.”  
Despite the expected problems caused by forcing most LLC member 
disputes into the derivative mold, in analogous close-corporation 
squabbles, applying essentially the identical corporate procedures that now 
control LLC actions, sample cases clearly show that the plaintiff can be 
very successful.267  The business court recently determined that one of the 
two dentists in LeCann had wrongfully diverted $559,888 from their 
practices and was thus liable to reimburse his corporations for that amount 
plus an additional $1,679,664 in punitive damages.268  Cases in other 
jurisdictions likewise demonstrate that LLC member wrongdoing can be 
successfully rectified through the derivative suit.269 
Maybe all that is really important is whether a putative plaintiff is 
offered some method of bringing a claim—be it direct or derivative.  Once 
the action is filed, as pointed out by former Chief Business Court Judge 
John Jolly, most of these cases ultimately settle.270  As long as the unhappy 
member can file some sort of action, regardless of its form, maybe this is 
all that is really necessary.  It will be interesting to see how this new LLC 
act impacts the resolution of the expected increasing number of squabbles 
that LLC owners will encounter. 
 
 267. See, e.g., LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *32 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012). 
 268. Id. at *13–14 (noting that the defendant, as a 50% owner, would be entitled to one-
half of the award). 
 269. See, e.g., Tully v. McLean, 948 N.E.2d 714, 729 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (demonstrating 
that the court may remove the breaching manager from his position, which in turn might 
trigger the automatic dissolution of the LLC); Haut v. Green Café Mgmt., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 
171 (Tex. App. 2012).  In Haut, the court ordered forfeiture of a membership, possibly 
valued at $600,000, because of the many breaches of fiduciary duties to the LLC.  Id. at 
176–77.  Peculiarly, the losing member in that case argued that he owed fiduciary duties 
directly to only the members, and thus, the LLC had no standing to pursue breach-of-
fiduciary-duty claims against him—an argument that the court rejected.  Id. at 180; see also 
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 9:10, at 516–19 (listing remedies available in 
derivative LLC suits); cf. Risk Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C. v. Moss, 40 So. 3d 176, 179 (La. Ct. 
App. 2010) (finding the former manager liable in a direct suit for breach of fiduciary duty 
and awarding over $7.5 million in damages to the LLC). 
 270. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
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